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From the Editor  
Editor in chief
Carolyn Noble
Carolyn Noble
Another exciting edition of social dialogue has now been completed drawing together 
articles on the rise of populism and its impact on social work. While its impact is only 
just beginning to be analysed by social workers across the globe, one thing is certain is 
that its impact will have dire consequences for our profession and its human rights and 
social justice agenda if the more obvious issues and consequences are not addressed 
more forcibly now. 
This new culture of post truth where lies and half facts can be peddled as true (despite 
evidence to the contrary!), where truth is manipulated (blatantly now, without fear 
of rebuke) where political gain and personal and familial power are sought with little 
pushback then there is much to fear about the sustainability of our democracy, for the 
‘rule of law’ and ‘separation of powers’. This is especially concerning when executive 
decision-makers (e.g. presidents or prime ministers) assume more and more powers 
outside the democratic process of debate and review.  Where the political class use 
vulnerable people such as refugees, asylum seekers, LGBTQI communities as well as 
indigenous peoples right to their land, clean and safe water and key global issues such 
as terrorism and conﬂ ict matters in general (e.g. North Korea, Syria and Iran) as many of 
the reasons to be afraid. 
Activists who are raising concerns about abuses of human rights and the increasing 
level of violence against marginalised group as well as the planet ability to sustain itself 
in the future are seen as undermining the security of the state and its people and are 
to be feared and in many cases viliﬁ ed. Rather than tackle these issues, the political 
class present this manufactured fear as the very reason we need popular leaders and 
their agenda of restricting our democratic rights to freedom of association, freedom 
of the press, protection of whistle-blowers and ‘truth-tellers’ and the  right to  engage 
in  the advocacy of resistance.  We need their protection for our own continued safety 
and protection of our way of life. For those who see through this manipulation and the 
vested interests who are peddling this fear argue that George Orwells’ dystopian novel 
1984 is fast becoming a reality for many people in the remaining so called democratic 
countries. 
These events, as predicted, raise important issues for social work. A critical social 
work analysis and practice presents social work with a feasible critique for an urgent 
response.  While more debate is needed this issue of social dialogue is presented as an 
attempt to bring these issues to the fore.   Enjoy!  
From the Guest Editor
Guest Editor
Janet Carter Anand
Janet Carter 
Anand
Populism has been an important topic in recent symposiums of a growing network of 
social work practitioners and academics that I am involved in called Building Networks 
and Frameworks for Global Social Work. The question as how to address the negative 
consequences of populism through education, research and practice demands attention 
and will be continue to be explored at our next symposium in Kochi, India. However you 
can read papers from past network symposiums in this journal edition.
Social workers across most western countries face new forces of conservativism. 
Neoliberalism with its emphasis on eﬃ  ciency and eﬀ ectiveness is surpassed by populist 
belief in simplistic solutions to complex global social problems. Populist leadership 
displays very little respect for economic justiﬁ cations, scientiﬁ c arguments, or human 
rights. It involves a way of thinking that legitimates the unpopular and in extreme cases 
a hatred of the other as an OK response to any perceived threat to one’s privilege 
position or lifestyle. In this sense, populism has also rekindled east west and north 
south tensions. 
Forced migration to Europe is a key focus for the expression of populist sentiment. 
Middle Eastern refugees in Europe are the scapegoats, even in the most progressive 
of European welfare states. The media tends to promote an image of people seeking 
asylum as burdens on the economy or security threats to society, fueling concerns as 
to new forms of sectarianism and radicalization. Yet social science research provides 
extensive evidence that such images are not based on evidence and that immigration 
contributes to the economic, social and cultural capital and development of recipient 
countries.  
Therefore, the question for social workers is how to respond critically to growing 
populist beliefs reﬂ ected in society, social policy and welfare delivery. Solutions lie 
in the sharing and application of theories that increase our awareness of populism, 
the adoption of practice strategies promoting analytical practice, the application of 
evidenced based interventions and the importance of promoting global mindedness. 
This edition of Social Dialogue provides inspiring examples of how to go about this. 
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4Dear Colleagues, 
We are here with another exciting volume of Social 
Dialogue online magazine. The last quarter was marked 
by several signiﬁ cant activities of IASSW.  I would like to 
highlight the initiatives relating to World Social Work Day.
The 2017 world Social Work Day has been celebrated in 
diﬀ erent part of the world with many initiatives focusing 
on the third pillar of the Global Agenda:  Working 
toward environmental and community sustainability. 
Social Work day in Geneva- IASSW and IFASW in 
collaboration with United Nations agencies, the 
University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western 
Switzerland – Social Work, Geneva (HETS) and 
UN Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNIRISD) have organized the “Social Work and 
Sustainability” conference with the participation of 
many representatives of UN agencies, academics and 
NGOS. This was held on March 21 and 22, 2017 at the 
prestigious Palais des Nations, Geneva.
The key note address was presented by Lena Dominelli 
(Durham University, UK and former IASSW President). 
Reﬂ ecting on “Green social work, environmental justice 
and the global agenda”, Lena Dominelli emphasized the 
human impact of climate change and environmental 
disasters and the roles that social work needs to play in 
prevention, mitigation and sustainable development. 
The conclusions were prepared by the combined eﬀ orts 
from Rory Truell, Anne Lavanchy and myself underling 
some commitments and possible cooperation between 
IASSW, IFSW and UN Agencies:
• Increasing the knowledge and visibility of social work 
approaches and capacity within UN Agencies (eg. 
form a body / network of social workers working with 
and within the UN agencies) 
• Creating joint guidelines on how social work 
organizations can successfully engage with UN 
national and regional oﬃ  ces.  
• Building into social work education and practice 
related policies information on the role of UN 
agencies, the SDG’s and bridging this with social work 
approaches • Establishing joint strategic 
research that enhances the role of social work in 
fulﬁ lling the SDGs.
• Providing information on the role of social work in 
fulﬁ lling the SDGs and creating job descriptions to 
support joint workforce development strategies
At the end of the 21st meeting there has been a 
launch of the book Getting to Zero. Global Social Work 
respond to HIV, chief edited by Mark Henrikson. This 
joint initiative IASSW/UNAIDS was undertaken by Vimla 
Nadkarni (Immediate Past President of IASSW) and Mark 
Henrikson after the WSWD in 2014. 
The book can be download for free at : http://www.
unaids.org/en/resources/documents/2017/global-social-
work-responds-to-HIV
Social Work Day at the UN 
Headquarters - New York
34th World Social Work Day was celebrated on April 
4, 2017 at the UN Headquarters New York, which 
focused on “Promoting Community and Environmental 
Sustainability”. The presentations underlined diﬀ erent 
experiences and reﬂ ections  on the topic from a variety 
of positions: the Bangladesh Ambassador Masud Bin 
Momen, Permanent UN Representative of the Mission 
of Bangladesh; John Ennis, Chief of Information and 
Outreach in the Oﬃ  ce of Disarmament Aﬀ airs-UN; Terri 
Klemm, Associate Professor and BSW Program Director, 
Centenary University; Elizabeth Gustafson MSW Student 
from the University of Connecticut, Roberto Borrero, 
NGO Committee on the Rights of Indigenous People. 
Shirley Gatenio Gabel (IASSW) served as co-chair of the 
event with Robin Mama (IFSW).
As IASSW President, I had the task to wrap up the 
discussion and provide concluding remarks.
The WSWD was attended by almost 400 people: 
professionals, students, teachers and the event was 
video recorded by the UN. http://bit.ly/2t63cjs
This celebration was followed by the Student’s Forum on 
“World Water Rights: Promoting Environmental Justice in 
a Globalized World”. These initiatives are very important 
to strengthen the link and the cooperation with UN, but 
also to make visible the social work commitment in the 
society. We are looking forward to receiving documents 
about initiatives that have been undertaken in diﬀ erent 
countries so that regional observatories can prepare a 
comprehensive report about the engagement of social 
work in promoting environmental and community 
sustainability. 
We are working hard to have future World Social Work 
Day celebrations  also in UN Bangkok and Nairobi 
headquarters. We hope to have more representatives 
globally and make it truly international.
I will be writing more updates in the next volume of 
Social Dialogue magazine, hope you will enjoy reading 
this volume. 
With warm regards,
From the IASSW President’s Desk
Advertising in the International 
Association of Schools of Social Work 
(IASSW) Social Dialogue magazine:
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worldwide
Supports IASSW magazine
Rates for advertising are as follows:
1/4 page $300 USD
1/2 page $500 USD
1/2 page $250 USD (Lower income 
countries)
Full page $850 USD
Full page $1000 USD (Special placement)
For more details, please contact us: hello@iassw-aiets.org 
or go online to iassw-aiets.org and view the advertising kit
Would you like your 
education program, 
business proﬁ le and 
opportunities to 
be available to our 
extensive human 
services readership?
Prof. Annamaria Campanini
President, International Association of Schools of Social Work (IASSW)
5
6Jioji Ravulo
Senior Lecturer 
(Social Work)
School of Social 
Sciences and 
Psychology
Western Sydney 
University
Deﬁ nitions
While there are many deﬁ nitions of populism and 
populist leaders moving from the left to the right 
spectrum of politics there are some common factors in 
the search for a deﬁ nition that many scholars agree.
• Populism arises in the context of a political crisis, 
when legitimacy of institutions is questioned, and 
when the political status quo seems incapable of 
responding to populist demands.
• Populist movements are headed by strong 
charismatic or messianic leaders who have the fate 
of the nation in (mostly) his hands. 
• Populist leaders more often come from outside the 
political class, that is they are outsiders to the ruling 
elites. Their appeal is that they are from the ordinary 
population and uncontaminated by the political class 
and their long term enshrined interests.
• Populist leaders appeal to the need to restore what 
appears to be missing, eg national pride, strong 
hand against violence and /or political disarray, or a 
return to honesty, strong leadership, push for more 
eﬀ ective social change/ social justice etc.
• Populist leaders make a strong appeal towards 
nationalism both domestically and as a stance on the 
international stage. 
• Populist leaders expose the traditional elites as the 
enemy of the ordinary people.
• Populist leaders attach and discredit traditional civil 
society organisations and political parties who are 
seen as unnecessary, and useless to the restoration 
proper power back ‘to the people.’
• Populist leaders seem to create followers rather than 
informed citizens.
• Populism remains a politics of hope- a type of 
redemptive politics where the messianic leader 
promises a better world for those left behind or 
locked out of economic, social and cultural rewards 
and privileges resulting from the move to neo-
liberalism and globalisation.  Many articulate a strong 
argument against the perils of capitalism and the 
inequality it spawns, even in cases where their power 
is based.
• The populist cause can, in many instances unite very 
diﬀ erent grievances
• The populist desire for a (de facto unachievable) 
unity shows a surprising aﬃ  nity between populist 
political imagination and totalitarianism and 
• Populist leaders seem to thrive on confrontation, 
often creating divisions to garnish support (Griﬃ  th 
Review 57, 2017; Muller, 2014; Mudde, 2007; Vieten & 
Pointing, 2016; de la Torre, 2014).
The reasons (most often cited)
• Economic inequality.
• Anti-immigrant attitudes (fear new migrants/the Other).
• Mistrust of global and national governance.
• Support for authoritarian values. 
• Growing anger from the people left behind by 
progressive tides of cultural change which they do 
not share (eg older generation, men, The religious, 
ethnic majorities, less educated).
• Generational conﬂ ict, and
• Left-right ideological placement (Inglehart & Norris, 
2016; Moghadam, 2013; Torres, 2006).
Paul Ham (2017) in his article “So you want to rule like 
an autocrat; six-step guide to putting your country ﬁ rst” 
gives a good overview of strategies to expose the how 
you too can be a populist leader in the current political 
ﬂ ux. Here is a summary of his excellent article.
Tools (ready-made accessories) 
• “A handy scape goat (Muslims, refugees, asylum 
seekers, the alt-left, Mexicans, women).
• An angry, elderly while majority with a distrust of 
foreigners.
• An easily mocked ‘elite’ of harmless academics, 
writers and liberals (and progressive media and 
whistle-blowers). 
• A list of lies posing as politics.
• A billionaire hedge-fund manager or person with 
access to unlimited cash.
• A thuggish foreign regime keen to sabotage your 
democracy (if one isn’t available make it up!).
• A complicit press or complaisant press, and
• An ideological poohbah with an apocalyptic message” 
(Ham, 2017, p.28).
Method (for implementation) 
• “Choose your scapegoat and vilify them (can make it 
up as well).
• Tap your rich donors and crony regime (eg right 
-wing leaders from any country or puppet leader 
your government supports).
• Appeal to your press pals (nudge right-wing bloggers 
with track record in scorn and ridicule and who are 
known and accepted as serial fabricators eg Shock-jocks. 
• Weaponise the internet and subvert your democracy 
(anti-terrorist laws, increasing police powers, 
restriction on who and how to protest, increase in 
surveillance laws).
• Lie and pollute media with these bald-faced lies and 
fake news (and repeat them until they become ‘facts’).
• Stoke fears of war and issue apocalyptic threats” 
(Ham, 2017, pp.28-35).
Carolyn Noble
Associate Dean 
(Social Work)
ACAP Sydney, 
Australia 
What is this new thing called ‘populism’?
Introduction
In this short article, I attempt to gather some ideas that might 
help address the question: what is this new thing called 
populism? and give some suggestions as to how social work 
might respond to the challenge it poses. Mudde (2007) suggests 
that populism is loosely grouped ideas that have at least three 
features: anti-establishment, authoritarianism and nativism, and 
is once again on the rise across the globe. Populists parties, 
leaders and politics are accused of disrupting and unsettling 
previous compromises of the past left and right politics during 
the last century. So, what explains this phenomenon? 
FEATURE
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Social work challenges and response
According to Fazzi (2015) the rise of populism and its more right-
wing aspect has yet to be tackled and investigated by the social work 
profession. Concern focussing on the impact of globalisation and 
the reorganisation of social services in a depleted and underfunded 
welfare state because of the unchecked rise of neo-liberal economic, 
social and cultural policies has resulted in the rise of populist politics 
and leaders going under the radar of critical analysis and public 
commentary (Fazzi, 2015).  As well as the demise of the welfare state 
Fazzi (2015) notes that the progressive growth of populist’s political 
ideologies poses further attacks on social works role as protector of 
human rights and as proponents of social tolerance and a just society.  
Paralleling further attacks on the welfare state and its universal service 
provision is the connection between the rise in populism and the 
demonstrable increase in prejudices against immigrants and members 
of minority/marginal ethnic groups. Briskman (2016) warns social 
workers about the challenge the rise in demonising migrants, asylum 
seekers and refugees are having on the profession and Latham (2016) 
asks the question about the rise in Islamophobia, e.g. whose side is 
the profession on?, noting its silence in the public arena. Both these 
activists challenge practitioners to call attention to the drift towards 
xenophobia and the victimisation and violence these minority groups 
face daily. 
Another challenge worthy of attention is the temptation of 
overworked and under resourced practitioners to use populist 
discourse as an easy ‘escape route’ to ﬁ nd answers to the almost 
unsolvable social issues stemming from rising wealth inequality and 
the profound changes transforming the workforce and society in 
post-industrial countries. Blame a ready-made victim (eg Muslims) 
can be an easy solution especially for overworked professionals who 
depend on conservative and populist government funding for their 
services. Further, reﬂ ecting a deep discontent with loss of autonomy, 
deep spending cuts, restructuring of public services and the move 
towards privatisation and increasing political interference in their work 
especially their work with asylum seekers and other marginal social 
groups can result in little appetite for resistance and social action. The 
‘do nothing’ or ‘keep heads down’ option can engender a dangerous 
erosion of the ethical and cultural base of the profession (Fazzi, 2015, 
604). 
However rather than succumbing to the potential destructive 
inﬂ uences of the current expression of populism these scenarios 
described here can provide social work with another opportunity to 
regenerate a radical practice response.  In summary, a radical social 
work response would include practitioners and scholars to;
• Work in solidarity to develop and support a humanise society,
• Aﬃ  rm and recommit to a practice with a human rights agenda and 
become more politically and morally active as role models,
• Re-commit to anti-racist, anti-oppressive and critically informed 
social work practice,
• Give witness to the human toll of subjugation, oppression, racism 
and structural disadvantage,
• Challenge the ‘dual loyalty’ dilemma (clients’ rights vs government 
policy of social control).
• Publicly ﬁ ght for political accountability, transparent democracy 
and social justice agenda in policy and human service practice, and
• Join unions and challenge populist policies wherever they manifest 
themselves (Briskman, 2016; Latham, 2016; Fazzi, 2015)   
What is Populism?
Populism is a mode of political 
communication that champions the 
common person. It is a political program 
that is centred on creating a contrast 
and conﬂ ict between the ‘common man 
(voter)’ and a real or imagined group 
of ‘privileged elites’(political class).  
Populism usually combines elements 
of the left and the right, opposing large 
business and ﬁ nancial interests but also 
frequently being hostile to established 
socialist and labour parties ( see https://
www.britannica.com/topic/populism ). 
In the 21st Century, the term populism 
is most often associated with an 
authoritarian form of politics. Populist 
politics, revolves around a charismatic 
leader who appeals to and claims to 
embody the will of the people in order 
to consolidate his/her own power. In this 
personalized form of politics, political 
parties lose their importance and 
relevance. The (democratic) elections 
serve to conﬁ rm the leader’s authority 
rather than to reﬂ ect the diﬀ erent 
allegiances of the people.
The waves of populism not only in the 
Populism in the Asia: 
What role for Asian Social Work?
Introduction
Mizuno and Phongpaichit in their book Populism in Asia 
(2009) have argued that across Asia, “populist” leaders have 
emerged on an unprecedented scale around the start of 
the 21st century. We argue that this has many implications 
for Asian social work. This article discusses some of these 
implications.
Bala Raju Nikku 
Social Work 
Section, School 
of Social 
Sciences, 
Universiti Sains 
Malaysia 
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Asian region but globally is evident of the re-emergence 
of new type of global and regional dynamics of power, 
populism and politics. For example, in  2017 the British 
people voted in favor of the United Kingdom (UK) exiting 
from the European Union; the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel in trying to gather the popular vote is 
calling for a partial ban on the burqa; the unexpected 
rise of Donald Trump to the US oval oﬃ  ce; the fall 
of Italian leader Matteo Renzi; and the Modi wave 
of politics in India give some indication of the rising 
populism across the globe. Social work should take note 
of its development and assess its impact and, either 
globally, regionally or locally gathers a response as 
its impact on the citizens, the state and communities 
unfold. 
In its most democratic form, populism seeks to defend 
the interest and maximize the power of ordinary 
citizens, through reform rather than revolution. 
Exclusive populism focuses on shutting out stigmatised 
groups (refugees, migrants for example), and is more 
common in Europe. Inclusive populism demands that 
politics be opened up to stigmatised groups (the poor, 
minorities). The western populists like that of Donald 
Trump have used the rhetoric of exclusive populism, 
while the Asian leaders like that of Modi of India have 
used inclusive populism.  At the end of the day  both 
have captured the power and voters loyalty. 
While the rise of a populist movement is not new 
and has taken many forms over the last century 
its reemergence in the new millennia needs some 
attention. The question we are interested in is; What are 
the issues? What needs to be done? And What role can 
Asian social workers play in creating a response?  The 
relationship between the (political) populism and social 
work has not been well investigated, and hence this 
edition of Social Dialogue focusing on this theme is not 
only apt but crucial to generate social work scholarship 
on this phenomenon. 
Asian Populism
The rise of populism under Ferndinand Marcos, Joseph 
E. Estrada Thaksin Shinawatra (who is currently in 
self exile) in Thailand, Pushpa Kamal Dahal (known as 
Prachanda) in Nepal, Dr Mahathir Mohamad who served 
as the Prime Minister of Malaysia from 1981-2003, and 
more recently Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India 
are considered by many as populists politicians from 
the Asia region. Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs and 
killings as a populist agenda in the Philippines is another 
obvious example and the populist uprising that toppled 
South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye, the ﬁ rst woman 
to be elected as the President and served from 2013 to 
2017, who is now facing legal prosecution, may also ﬁ t in 
with current deﬁ nitions. 
The irony is many Asian populists who rise to power 
have used symbolic uses of violence. For example 
Prachanda in Nepal and Rodrigo Duterte in the 
Philippines used extra judicial killings and human 
rights violations to display their power and to show 
the masses that enemies ( i.e the elite) are being  
eliminated. In fact the assassinated may not be the 
real enemy of the public but for the populist politician, 
who does not want any opposition and dissent to grow 
these people are seen as easy targets. However, not all 
populist leaders use violence to gather popular support. 
Let’s also look at Malaysia’s neighbor Indonesia, with 
the largest number of Muslim population. In the 2014 
Indonesian Presidential elections, the down-to-earth 
former carpenter and Jakarta governor (popularly 
known as Jokowi), advanced a new form of technocratic 
populism that was inclusive, non-confrontational, and 
primarily focused on improving the quality of public 
service delivery. Jokowi unlike his rival candidate 
Prabowo (who used confrontational populism), rightly 
understood the mood and sentiments of Indonesian 
electorate who were tired and frustrated of 16 years 
of autocratic and oppressive regimes.  Hence with a 
foresight, Jokowi applied pragmatic populism, promising 
rapid improvements in the workings of government the 
way it delivers its services. This strategy worked well for 
Jokowi instead of selling grand political visions which 
has been the norm in the Indonesian political battles. 
At the same time Jokowi being a non-confrontational 
politician allowed the powerful and elite to maintain 
their interests to a greater extent. This dual approach 
of technocratic approach coupled with speciﬁ c populist 
style helped Jokowi not only to come to the power but to 
survive the presidency.  
Modi in India and despite his Hindu Ultra nationalist 
image was able to convince the Indian voters who 
gave him ( and his BJP party) a huge victory in the 2014 
elections. He was able to form his own government 
without coalition partners for the ﬁ rst time in 30 years. 
This is quite a signiﬁ cant change considering the 
history of Indian politics. Since the 1990s (until 2014) no 
single political party has won a majority in the national 
polls and has had to form the coalition government 
to assume power.  Many of these coalitions did not 
survived the full term in oﬃ  ce because of self-interest 
and inter and intra rivalry conﬂ icts and slowed down 
government business which meant that they were 
slow to formulate people oriented policies resulting in 
the gradual degeneration of democratic rights of the 
citizens. Now with a full majority in the Parliament, it 
one sided and authoritative approach to governing, 
which is happening with the current Modi’s majority 
rule. 
If we compare Modi of India and Jokowi of Indonesia 
and their political ideologies and populist strategies, 
we see that these two men could not have been 
more diﬀ erent in background and politics but were 
successful by using similar populist political strategies 
to a garner support for the politics Their success in in 
mobilizing voters especially the masses (the poor) as 
their main constituency and by attacking the rich and 
elite demonizing them as collective enemy of the poor 
and the political class these populist leaders  and t 
secured their rise high oﬃ  ce in their own country. For 
example, both focused on the poor in their country 
and by using pro-poor images and their own (humble) 
background as a commoner they presented themselves 
as understanding the common man’s struggles. Both 
have used inclusive religious populism to win the votes. 
In addition to the rhetoric to oﬀ er corruption free 
governance, typically these two charismatic politicians 
have marketed themselves both as uncompromising 
defenders of the rights and interests of the common 
people and as the only true representatives and 
promoters of ‘genuine democracy’ (Betz, 2001). 
Populist political leaders from the Asia and West seem 
to have similar values and strategies that ae in direct 
contrast with social works values of respect for human 
life and protection of vulnerable people and support 
for democratic rule and redistributive welfare system 
of governance. For example, during Mr. Modi’s vist to 
the USA during June 2017, President Trump did not 
comment publicly on the crackdown on civil society 
in India, or the threat posed to vulnerable groups 
under Modi’s rule. Nor did he mention the populist 
hate campaign that has produced brutal mob killings 
of Muslims suspected of trading or consuming beef 
in selected Indian states. Similarly, Mr. Modi did not 
raise any alarm over the Trump administration’s travel 
ban on people from several Muslim countries or police 
abuse in the USA. He is also did not mention or cite 
any remark about the hate fueled death attacks on 
Native and Black Americans and other minority groups 
(eg Muslims) under the Trump administration.  In fact, 
the most obvious thing in common with these populist 
leaders is their support for each other use of violence 
and silencing dissent and their almost unqualiﬁ ed 
support for, or inciting incidents of, racism, misogyny, 
islamophobia, homophobia, transphobia, anti-Semitism, 
and anti-immigrant sentiments more than was obvious 
in the past decades. We argue then, from the examples 
above that populism and populists regimes can be 
fertile grounds for further spreading sentiments of 
separatism and exclusion politics and autocratic rule. As 
a result, more people are excluded from the democratic 
processes and their human rights are abused and 
violated. There is a clear role for social workers to 
respond to these regimes styles by using political social 
work models.
Populism or Pluralism: What Role of 
Asian Social Work?
The 21st century is witnessing more of populist policy 
making, lead by a single muscular nationalist leader 
leading the way. The contradiction is that these 
autocratic tendencies to incite exclusion and division is 
antithetical to solving the growing poverty, inequality 
and rights violations  to name a few that have helped 
these leaders  capture  power and political stardom 
in the ﬁ rst place. Political populists have managed to 
weaken even the established political parties and used 
societal fears of anti establishment, aggravating popular 
anxieties like that of globalization, and nuclear threats to 
name a few to launch their successful populist electoral 
campaigns and captured powerful political oﬃ  ces.  The 
use of fear has been a powerful mobiliser the populist 
vote! This form of Asian populism may rise further 
and also reappear or spread across other countries in 
the region. This is due to the general disillusionment 
and increasing poverty of the general public who are 
losing conﬁ dence in the State as the main provider of 
services and care taker of their lives. They rather believe 
in populist leaders and give their vote and democratic 
power over to them to rule. 
Why should social workers be concerned about, 
understand and analyse populism?  Is it because 
many Asian societies are still impoverished and are 
experiencing severe violations of human rights and 
minimum standards of living?  In assuming more power 
and failing to tackle corruption and cronyism, these 
populist regimes are further weakening civil rights 
movements and increasing the economic hardship for 
the most disadvantaged in our communities leaving 
social workers puzzled and powerless in Asia (and 
probably in the west too!) as to how to respond. We 
know that social Work has to play a crucial role in 
ensuring human rights and well being in the region, 
but how? What skills do social workers acquire to work 
against populist agendas?
Asian social work can be a powerful catalyst to resist 
political populism by working towards a pluralistic 
society that can resist populist politics that are mainly 
based on divide and rule. Social workers should be 
involved in grassroots organizing and helping people- 
the masses to understand the party politics and 
politics of populist polices and form alternative polices 
to counteract this development. Hence there is a 
continued role for political social work in the region to 
empower people with information and policy knowledge 
so as to make right choices in electing peoples 
representatives who in turn are accountable, not only to 
their voter citizens but also to the entire population that 
includes refugees, migrant without papers and other 
disadvantage groups in the Asian Society. 
To conclude, we argue that questions of cultural identity, 
values, religion, human rights, economic prosperity, 
poverty, ethnicity, citizenship and federalism are bound 
to dominate the political agenda for next few decades in 
Asia. Under these circumstances, the Asian social work 
has to play a proactive role to be in a position to carve 
out a larger niche in the Asian democracy and political 
market space.  
Further reading:
Betz, H. G. (2001). Exclusionary Populism in Austria, Italy, 
and Switzerland. International Journal, 56,3,, 393-420.
Kosuke, M., & Phongpaichit, P. (2009). Populism in Asia. 
Singapore: NUS Press.
Pinker, R. (1984). Populism and the Social 
Services. Social Policy & Administration, 18,1 , 89-99.
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The situation of asylum seekers raises a fundamental 
question of the role of social work with and for people 
seeking refuge. Social workers are often employed by 
the public sector and are required to enact the current 
policy and practices of the national agenda whose aim 
is to reinforce a national unity often with little regard 
to understanding the needs of asylum seekers and 
transnational population in general. Thus, social work 
practises may become nationalistic and exclusive to 
asylum seekers. In furthering the national agenda 
social workers may (wittingly or unwittingly) take part 
in processes of othering, which can exclude those who 
do not ﬁ t into national ideals (e.g. Keskinen et. al., 2012; 
Anis, 2008). At worst, social work practise can become 
ethnocentric and ´chauvinist´ if social workers follow 
the national framework and accept without question the 
moral panic linked to the inﬂ ux of refugees and asylum 
seekers without understanding the global nature of 
social problems and transnational processes of (forced)
migration (Wallimann, 2014: 19). 
Social work ethics has a clear demand for working with 
and for the people whose human dignity is threatened 
by the inadequate policies including those of the nation 
states as well as those of the international communities. 
According to social work ethics, social workers have a 
moral and professional responsibility as practitioners 
to work for and with vulnerable communities such as 
asylum seekers and refugees. Further there are real 
and urgent material needs which must be addressed. 
If asylum seekers are not recognized as legitimate 
refugees and they choose to stay undocumented in 
a country their immediate needs may remain unmet 
due to their marginalisation and exclusion. The moral 
issue here is that the hostile treatment and lack of 
support and empathy for asylum seekers indicates 
that their human rights and right for protection by the 
international community are ignored, even violated.  
Social workers could be more active in this space 
by focusing their attention on harnessing the moral 
community which could take care of them as human 
beings that deserve respect and protection (e.g. 
Turton, 2003.) The moral community could mean those 
networks to whom the demands of sense of obligations 
are recognized. Here I look at the theory of recognition 
(Honneth, 1995), which can give some moral yardsticks 
for social work with asylum seekers. 
Why the theory of recognition as a 
source of ethical demands 
Axel Honneth’s (1995) theory of recognition focuses on 
a normative criteria of a good society where normative 
issues and interpersonal relations are interrelated. 
The recognition theory has three dimensions, which 
are the interpersonal relations of respect, esteem and 
care. Persons are justiﬁ ed to expect these relations 
or attitudes from each other in mutual relationships. 
Thus, in a social space of mutual respect, esteem and 
care, people can grow to be persons with healthy self-
respect, self-esteem and self-conﬁ dence. In other words, 
these self-attitudes contribute to a person’s ability for 
self-realisation. If a person cannot get recognition in a 
mutual relationship with others, their ability to govern 
themselves may be harmed. (Ikäheimo, 2003: 125–140.) 
In social work, the relations of recognition can provide 
´a prism through which social workers can “tune in” to 
ethical imperatives´ (Houston, 2009: 1288). Besides, 
when people are treated as persons in social relations, 
it enables trust formation between service users and 
authorities (Turtiainen, 2012). In a good society, and 
especially in social work encounters, ´the social´ cannot 
remain just bounded by the good will of the people 
as ‘the social’ can play a more fundamental role with 
normative claims (Niemi 2014). Next, I discuss the social 
work with asylum seekers and undocumented migrants 
in the theoretical frame of Honneth’s relations of 
recognition. 
Respect
Respect as one relation of recognition means that 
people have juridically institutionalised rights and 
entitlements. For asylum seekers, it is hard to be 
a moral equal with other residents without having 
rights and other entitlements. Second respect takes 
place in interpersonal relations because other people 
are needed to respect and conﬁ rm that persons are 
competent agents and capable of making justiﬁ cations 
(Ikäheimo, 2003; Seglow, 2016). Therefore, rights give 
a moral basis for contributing healthy self-respect, 
which secures persons’ agency through authoring their 
lives. In respect of self-realisation, asylum seekers and 
undocumented migrants are extremely vulnerable as 
without a residence permit they do not have the ability 
to claim rights in any nation state that rejects their claim 
for asylum. 
Social work with asylum seekers and undocumented 
migrants cannot use only national and popular 
sentiments to inform their practice with asylum 
seekers and refugees but must base their work on 
ethical principles informed by a human rights agenda 
as a framework beyond the dedicates of a particular 
nation state in which they work (e.g. Staub-Bernasconi, 
2014). In practise, social workers must ﬁ nd a way to be 
co-authors with their clients in forming their practice 
responses by listening to them and helping them 
through advocacy to acquire citizen rights from which 
they are currently excluded. Sometimes working with 
human rights activists and undertaking direct political 
action could be one way of counteracting the national 
or nationalistic measures of evaluating who deserves 
citizenship and protection and what kind of rights and 
entitlements refugees can claim (e.g. Briskman, 2014). 
To make his happem social work practice should get 
the mandate from the people not having rights and if 
possible in combination with (global) civil society (Staub-
Bernasconi, 2014: 31-32) act in solidarity to protect them 
and help them receive protection and safety.  
Care
Care as a relation of recognition concerns human 
beings being valued for their own sake. It means that 
people must be taken care of regardless of who or what 
kind of persons they are (Ikäheimo, 2003; Honneth, 
1995.) Recognition of the needs of migrants, especially 
asylum seekers and refugees, is often considered 
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Introduction
The desperate situation of people seeking asylum continues for many 
reasons. The root reasons to ﬂ ee from the countries of origins are not 
addressed enough as focus is on coping with the actual numbers and 
the possible impact on the country receiving them. The EU and other 
areas from the Global North want to reduce the numbers of asylum 
seekers by trying to block mobility to their territories and many nation 
states are making it much harder for asylum seekers and refugees to 
get residence permits, even if granted temporary sanctuary. While the 
European Union shows a lack of solidarity to share the responsibility 
of processing the asylum applications and taking care of the asylum 
seekers countries, like Italy, are trying to cope with more and more 
people trying to reach their borderlands. Consequently, asylum 
seekers have to seek out more dangerous routes and turn too more 
stronger (and possibly more dangerous) smuggling networks, which, 
as we have seen, result in thousands of people dying while trying to 
ﬁ nd refuge.  
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as instrumental for some other goals, usually economic such as 
skills shortage or need to cheap labour, not just persons deserving 
protection and good life in and of itself. I understand care as a 
relational concept has both private and public dimension. 
In practice, asylum seekers’ private care relations are transnational. 
Asylum seekers and undocumented migrants have often enormous 
life stressors in the countries of origin, such as war and family 
disintegration and undergone much hardship in their transition from 
country to country. Many have suﬀ ered torture and trauma even 
before they arrive as refugees. Therefore, social workers must take 
into these personal hardships as well as environmental concerns 
(money food, shelter) while assessing and planning interventions 
and evaluating the services (Hunter et. al. 2010). Based on the 
‘ethics of care’ any human being who is in a vulnerable state should 
have unconditional access to social and state care. In practice, 
undocumented migrants do not have access to long-term health 
and social care. Such exclusive structures requires social workers to 
step out from the state mandate that excludes them from such care 
in order to ﬁ ght for the right for these people. Therefore, care as a 
relation of recognition overlaps the relation of respect.  
Social esteem
Social esteem as a relation of recognition has at least three 
dimensions. First, social esteem concerns personal accomplishments, 
such as goals, education and work, which need to be recognised 
in a community (Seglow, 2009: 68). Asylum seekers and especially 
undocumented migrants lack this kind of recognition in a society 
and they become easily abused by the employers. From the social 
work perspective, personal relations to asylum seekers are important 
in order identify the potentials and visions of persons and also to 
maintain hope and develop strengths and opportunities in a society.  
Second, social esteem is a value that we give to each other in terms of 
our speciality, such as capabilities or achievements (Honneth, 1995; 
Ikäheimo, 2003). In this sense, esteem can be a valuable contribution 
to the common good. Possibilities for contributing to a new society is 
vital in order to have agency in the new situation. For undocumented 
migrants, this goal is strongly dependent on what, if any, particular 
rights they have in a new society such acknowledgement of their 
ethnicity or religion (Ikäheimo, 2003: 134). This is important as 
ethnicity may be a reason for persecution in the past and therefore 
getting back such rights may be vital for maintaining self-esteem in a 
new environment and help with their integration.  
Conclusions  
Asylum seekers end up in nation states which often defend their 
sovereignty instead of protecting human lives and recognising people 
seeking refuge and protection as people who are in an extremely 
vulnerable life situation. As employees of the state with national 
agendas, which divide people for those who are worthy to get 
recognition in a new society and those who are unworthy and are 
then left without care, respect and social esteem social work can ﬁ nd 
itself in an ambiguous situation. While the concept of ‘relations of 
the recognition’ are not new in social work practice re-invigorating  
its contribution to work with refugees and asylum seekers may 
contribute to social work practice by providing the sensitivity required 
to evaluate the complexity of explicit opinions, views and implicit 
background attitudes that aﬀ ect the way we encounter people (Niemi, 
2014; Ikäheimo, 2003: 137). This sensitivity is vital in order to avoid 
nationalistic and populistic interpretation of social problems. 
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Introduction
Over the past decade, there has been an increase in 
internationally displaced persons, which now stands 
at over 60 million people worldwide.  Currently, 
approximately 20 million people (one-third of the 60 
million) are considered refugees (UNHCR, 2017).  As 
individuals who are refugees migrate to another country 
and/or are resettled, question emerge about how to 
ensure that they are able to safely and adequately settle 
into a new cultural, economic, and legal context.  The 
two terms we see used in describing this process are 
“integration” and “inclusion.”  At a recent conference 
in Landshut, Germany, we engaged in a concerted 
dialogue about what these terms mean and how they 
are applied in diﬀ erent countries. One of our areas 
of discussion was how the rhetoric used to describe 
(un)successful refugee resettlement potentially 
intersects with right-wing populist arguments which 
demonize refugees as a security threat or which portray 
immigrants of any kind a threat to national identity.
“Integration” has become the hallmark of resettlement 
work in the U.S. and the U.K. without a concrete 
deﬁ nition of what it means (Ager & Strang, 2004).  
According to the dictionary, integration is “free 
association of people from diﬀ erent racial and ethnic 
backgrounds” and “incorporation as equals into society 
or an organization of individuals of diﬀ erent groups.” 
These deﬁ nitions suggest that people in a group or 
society work together to allow for incorporation of new 
individuals. Integration requires a reference frame that 
speciﬁ es the norm of a society. However, this frame 
may mean that norms are not speciﬁ ed at ﬁ rst and how 
a frame is designed depends on those who have the 
social power to deﬁ ne it (Brokamp 2016). This reference 
indicates that refugees coming to a new society must 
take a place within an extant framework for which they 
have no reference point. Sometimes this happens easily 
and without challenges because there are benevolent 
advocates from the established group, but in most cases 
there is a “struggle” because the established structures 
and understandings are those maintained by the group 
with existing privileges. With regard to access to a 
society, this means that the “new” must always measure 
themselves against the criteria of the “old.”
“Inclusion,” a term more recently used in Europe, 
radically alters this view by dispensing with a deﬁ ned 
reference frame and taking a closer look at the society 
as a whole – and acknowledging all of its various kinds 
of diversity. The dictionary deﬁ nes inclusion as “the 
action or state of including or of being included within 
a group or structure.” This frame suggests that newly 
arriving individuals can become part of the whole, which 
is the reference framework.  This framework refers to 
an ideal open society, which rejects dividing society into 
multiple closed spaces for which special access criteria 
apply. It is no longer necessary to look at why the 
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“newcomers” do not meet the existing access criteria, 
and what support they need in this regard, rather the 
structures for accessing the criteria themselves are 
questioned. This term and its understanding have 
radical consequences for systems such as a college/
university, which is built around structural barriers for 
accessing the system (for Germany see KMK 2015).
Country Frames
To clarify how these terms impact refugees resettled 
in diﬀ erent regions of the world, we provide three case 
examples:  Finland, Germany, and the U.S. All three 
countries have political parties in which nativist arguments 
are invoked by right-wing populist political actors.
Finland
Finland has traditionally been an emigration country 
and the population is considered more ethnically 
homogenous compared to most other European 
countries (Heikkilä & Peltonen, 2002).  The recent 
migration of Middle Eastern refugees (32,000 asylum 
seekers entered Finland in 2015/2016) has introduced 
yet another layer of ethno-cultural diversity into 
Finnish society. As a signatory state, Finland is fully 
committed to the UN Refugee Convention 1951 and 
takes a relatively legalistic approach to immigration 
and humanitarian issues (Tanner, 2016). The Ministry 
of Labor is primarily involved in the integration of 
refugees, who are then required to participate in a 
formal integration plan provided by the Labour Oﬃ  ce 
or municipal social security in order to receive beneﬁ ts. 
Successive Finnish governments have not been 
successful in promoting a diverse and socially inclusive 
society for migrants and nationalistic, anti-migration and 
populistic views persist.  Finnish research (Anu, 2012) 
on Russian, Somali and Kurdish immigrants reports 
signiﬁ cant health inequalities for migrants across 
key determinants of health, mental health and social 
wellbeing (Anu, 2012). 
It was no coincidence that at time of the so-called 
refugee crisis the Finns Party won the Finnish vote in the 
2015 elections and joined the government coalition as 
the second-largest party in Parliament. The Finns Party 
actively propagates nationalistic sentiments as to the 
virtues of being a true Finn alongside anti-immigrant 
rhetoric.  Finland has witnessed unprecedented protests 
and physical attacks against asylum seekers. The 
reasons for this crucial shift towards a more negative 
climate on immigration are many. The rise of social 
media has oﬀ ered an anonymous platform to express 
previously unpopular or politically incorrect ideas 
(Tanner 2016). Populist, xenophobic and nationalist 
sentiments have been fueled in part by an economic 
downturn in Finland. Asylum seekers and refugees, who 
receive well-publicized beneﬁ ts and show poor levels 
of integration, often become the scapegoat for many 
domestic social ills. 
The profession of social work in Finland plays a 
strong social administrative role in the reception and 
resettlement of refugees (Valtonen, 2001) and the 
Settlement Movement (based on the original work of Jane 
Addams) has a rich tradition in social and community 
action. These practices promote social inclusion within 
local communities. However, Finnish social workers 
ﬁ nd themselves pressured into more legalistic roles 
in promoting the integration of refugees with little 
or no resources available to facilitate more inclusive 
interventions and structural social work – whilst the 
communities in which they practice are shaped by 
contradictory humanitarian and populist views. 
Germany
How can the eﬀ orts to include refugees in German 
society be categorized? Do these eﬀ orts call existing 
barriers to access into question? The answer varies. 
Few of the many measures or projects implemented 
in Germany (for examples concerning access to 
universities see DAAD 2016) fulﬁ ll the criterion that 
existing barriers to access are questioned. Existing 
measures can still be described as a kind of “integration” 
because incorporation/assimilation into the logic of the 
majority society is still the focus of integrative practices.
On the other hand, in the ﬁ rst few months of the 
“refugee crisis” in 2015, a major part of society tried 
to change this integrative perspective. For the ﬁ rst 
time, it could be observed that actors who have the 
power to determine access began to incorporate the 
perspectives of other “cultures.” Rules which had limited 
access began to be stretched with the aim of minimizing 
institutional barriers. This triggered a process: instead 
of trying to assign a special status to refugees and then 
attempting to integrate them into an existing frame 
of reference, actors attempted to rethink how various 
groups of people ﬁ nd access to society.  This was a 
fundamental shift which is better described as inclusion 
than integration. By ﬁ rst rethinking the basic criteria 
through which access to a society is granted, other 
barriers to access can be identiﬁ ed. This understanding 
of the process permits the criteria to be rethought 
and allows the articulation of further necessary steps 
through which “real” inclusion can be achieved.
For Germany, one can conclude that refugee 
resettlement is still seen from the perspective of 
integration but the challenges of refugee migration in 
2015-2016 opened society up to contemplating how 
newcomers could be incorporated in a more inclusive 
way. Recently, this development is challenged not only 
by populist actors like the right-winged AFD (Alternative 
für Deutschland) but also by politicians of the traditional 
parties who are using populist arguments to gain 
support of conservative voters before the upcoming election in 
Germany in late September. 
United States
In the U.S., resettlement agencies strive toward refugee integration.  
“Successful” integration means that individuals are employed 
and can pay their own bills. This deﬁ nition is based on federal 
expectations and what services programs supported by federal 
funding should provide. According to Ager and Strang (2004), there 
are 10 indicators of integration:  employment, housing, education, 
health, social bridges, social bonds, social links, language & cultural 
knowledge, safety & stability, and rights & citizenship.  While 
these indicators are important, it is unclear how to measure these 
indicators in the context of integration (Taintor & Lichtenstein, 2016). 
The task of integrating is placed fully on newly arriving individuals 
and not on the receiving/hosting communities. In addition, in the 
context of the 2017 Executive Orders issued by President Trump, 
there is an eﬀ ort to marginalize certain refugee communities, which 
further reduces the options for people of Muslim backgrounds to 
integrate into U.S. society.  Inclusion, as described above, is not on 
the radar for the U.S. and structural barriers are in place to ensure 
that integration is diﬃ  cult. For some communities, inclusion is 
almost impossible. Welcoming America, a non-proﬁ t agency in the 
U.S., has begun to deﬁ ne what “welcoming” means in the context of 
resettling immigrants and refugees—furthering a discussion about 
welcoming that may allow communities to identify methods of 
creatively promoting dialogue to better understand how receiving/
hosting and resettling communities can work toward integration, and 
possibly inclusion, together.
Conclusions
In the three national contexts brieﬂ y explored above, refugee 
migration brings political, legal and social challenges. The word 
“integration” in all three contexts seems to describe a top-down 
governmental practice of demanding adjustment from refugees 
and a basic willingness to adapt to a new political, legal and 
social context. While adjustment and adaptation are part of any 
process of migration, adherence to an integrative framework also 
may strengthen systemic and structural barriers which limit the 
full inclusion of refugees into professional and civic life. These 
integrative barriers include adherence to an “integration plan” in 
Finland, gatekeeping procedures to university admission in Germany, 
and the highly controversial 2017 Executive Orders in the United 
States. 
In the context of refugee integration and national politics, it is 
diﬃ  cult to separate out which elements of integration rhetoric 
reﬂ ect the nativist beliefs which political scientist Cas Mudde 
argues are the foundation of right-wing party families, and which 
elements of integration rhetoric reﬂ ect a populist ideology which 
pits a pure and homogenous people against a corrupt elite (Mudde 
2007). Nationalist demands to integrate may reﬂ ect a space in 
which nativism and populism can seamlessly overlap. “Integration” 
thus might prove to be a way of conceiving of resettlement that 
is especially susceptible to manipulation in right-wing populist 
rhetoric. Finnish political demonization of refugee welfare beneﬁ ts, 
German unwillingness to question structural barriers to access, 
and U.S. policies which place the burden of integration on refugee 
communities themselves all reﬂ ect obstacles to reframing the 
process of refugee resettlement through a lens of inclusion rather 
than integration. 
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Renowned for being a type of politics whose main intent and 
purpose is claiming to represent the opinions and wishes of 
ordinary people (Hornby, 2010), populism is present in diﬀ erent 
nations and for a multiplicity of reasons. It has been in existence 
for quite some time although attention to its deleterious eﬀ ects on 
migration is relatively recent and has often focused on the election 
of one controversial populist politician, Donald Trump of the United 
States, Brexit, and the European migration crisis that predominated 
the EU and its member states in 2015/16 (Wolf, 2017). For instance, 
increased migrant and refugee ﬂ ows have resulted in anti-
immigrant sentimentalities soaking mainstream politics in a number 
of countries with populist politics said to be on the rise in Europe, 
the Americas, and the Asia-Paciﬁ c.  There can be no doubt though 
that there has been scholarly neglect in so far as the venomous 
eﬀ ects of populism are concerned particularly in parts of Asia and 
Africa. What is even more worrisome is the peripheral role that 
social work continues to play in the ﬁ eld of migration. The prime 
motif of this treatise is to underscore that populism has serious 
negative ramiﬁ cations on migration and that opportunities exist for 
the social work profession to inﬂ uence both practice and education. 
A lot shall surely be depicted in the subsequent paragraphs.
Understanding migration
It is indisputable that as a fundamental part of human 
experience, migration is widely believed to be intrinsic 
to human nature. The International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM, 2015) gave an estimate of  972 million 
migrants globally. Of these, the minority, 232 million, 
were international migrants reportedly living in high-
income countries, while the majority, 740 million, were 
internal migrants moving within their own countries, 
mostly from rural to urban settings. The reasons why 
people move were multiple and varied; people often 
moved in pursuit of better socioeconomic opportunities, 
though migratory patterns may also result from civil 
conﬂ ict, political persecution, development activities, 
and natural disasters (International Federation of the 
Red Cross (IFRC), 2012). 
Indeed, people ﬂ ed their countries to escape from 
violent conﬂ icts, the results of economic failures, 
autocratic regimes among other reasons. Thus, it would 
seem that human insecurity played a signiﬁ cant role in 
population movements. This has led to migrants being 
viewed as helpless and persecuted people ﬂ eeing from 
violent conﬂ ict while at the same time some regard 
them as strangers from a distinct or foreign culture 
who are notorious for violating national borders and 
rules, breaking into countries, and putting pressure 
on impoverished communities. Witteler-Stiepelmann 
(2009) noted that uncontrolled migration inﬂ uenced the 
countries’ stability by:
• Flouting sovereign territory and border control, while 
extremists sought safe havens for planning assaults 
and recruiting supporters.
• Threatening economies by increasing competition 
for local resources and already-overstretched 
infrastructure and services.
• Causing conﬂ icts that hampered development.
• Threatening cultural identities, especially in closed 
ethnicities, where it led to discrimination and the 
suppression of minority interests.
Spiralling population growth, political instability, 
escalating ethnic conﬂ icts, persistent economic 
deterioration, abject poverty, and environmental shocks 
were all factors in migration (Adepoju, 2008). 
Refugees comprised a distinct group set apart in 
international frameworks, policies, and discourses and 
distinguished from those believed to have a choice in 
their migratory decisions. This distinction is problematic 
and the question of ‘choice’ and ‘force’ is a vexed issue. 
The binary between ‘economic migrant’ and ‘refugee’ 
continues to be challenged and is actually believed to be 
false. For example, it has been noted that assumptions 
of ‘a dichotomy between voluntary, economic, and 
migrant, on the one hand, and forced, political, and 
refugee, on the other’ (Holmes, 2013, p. 17) have not 
proved helpful in the study of the complex phenomenon 
of migration. The emergence of several divergent 
theories to explain migration has given rise to the need 
for an integrated framework to achieve its holistic 
understanding. Nonetheless, considering its prevalence 
in public and oﬃ  cial debates of displacement, it is 
important to consider how it manifests within migratory 
discourses. 
Global overview
Globally, there were 65.6 million forcibly displaced 
people in 2016 (United Nations Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), 2017). This group comprised:
• Internally displaced persons (IDPs) (n=40.3 million), 
that is, people who have been forced to leave their 
homes due to violence or disasters but remain in 
their country of origin (UNHCR, 2017).
• Refugees (n=22.5 million), that is, people who have 
been forced to ﬂ ee their country of origin due to fear 
of persecution (UNHCR, 2017).
• Asylum seekers (n=2.8 million), that is, people who 
had lodged applications for international protection 
in countries in which they hoped to settle (UNHCR, 
2017).
Of the 22.5 million refugees recorded at the end of 2016, 
17.2 million fell directly under the UNHCR’s mandate 
while the remaining 5.3 million were Palestinian 
refugees under the aegis of the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency (UNRWA) (UNHCR, 2017). Refugees, 
asylum seekers, and traﬃ  cked persons tended to 
attract most media attention, though this varied across 
contexts. In Australia, for example, the media and public 
debate focused on so-called ‘illegal migrants’, referring 
to people who arrived by boat and who were in oﬀ shore 
detention centres (Lidberg, 2016). In South Africa, 
xenophobic violence had directed attention to migrants 
from African countries (Hickel, 2014), while, in Europe, 
the Syrian refugee and migrant crisis was the centre of 
public attention (Syrian Refugees, 2016). 
Preoccupation with negativity
There has been a tendency to focus on the negative 
aspects of the complex phenomenon of migration. 
People described migration through metaphors such as, 
inﬂ uxes, tides, and ﬂ oods. The emphasis on migration 
as a problem overlooks possible positive aspects of 
migration for migrant-producing countries, destination 
countries, and migrants themselves (O’Reilly, 2012). This 
gap is increasingly being addressed in both scholarship 
and public debate, which identiﬁ es the beneﬁ ts 
resulting from migratory ﬂ ows at levels of the individual, 
community, state, and transnational relations are 
identiﬁ ed (Tevera & Chikanda, 2009). 
The European experience
Boros (2016) observed that new populist actors and 
the refugee crisis had dominated European politics 
when an estimated 1 million asylum seekers arrived 
in the European Union (EU) in 2015. Apart from these 
asylum seekers, it was believed that there were other 
migrants numbering several hundred thousand who 
also arrived in the EU as they took advantage of weak 
border controls and the fact that many governments 
appeared to be ill-prepared to deal with an inﬂ ux of 
migrants at such an unprecedented rate. As such, Wolf 
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Second language education has become a commodity 
often traded by nation states for refugee’s access to 
social beneﬁ ts, citizenship and in some cases, basic 
human rights (Edelsky, 2006). As a requirement of 
integration policy, migrants and refugees are often 
required to attend language classes in exchange 
for receipt of beneﬁ ts.  The number of language 
courses, programs and policies have expanded raising 
questions as to the quality, ethics and outcomes. 
This article highlights the highly political nature of 
language education and its role in developing and 
maintaining the nation state (Pennycook, 1990). 
Learning a language is connected to issues such as 
multiculturalism, bilingualism, minority education and 
internationalism and yet the inherent political and 
culture issues are relatively ignored by government 
and language education services. The acquisition 
of a second language is essential in achieving 
social equality however language education may 
unintentionally serve to facilitate the reproduction of 
social inequalities within a society.
The authors would like to acknowledge 
the contribution of Johanna Rastas 
and Anniina Tourunen, Multicultural 
Center Kompassi, Setlementt Puijola and 
Katja Kiﬂ ie Beka and Elina Asikainen, 
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(2017) was of the viewpoint that the 2015/16 migration crisis 
had demonstrated beyond any iota of doubt that the EU and its 
member states would be dealing with increased immigration 
in the future. Wolf further argued that the migration crisis 
would have two consequences in the Western world. She 
believed the crisis would lead to religious pluralisation and 
cultural heterogeneity and the rise of populism throughout 
Europe, with populist movements riding on people’s social and 
economic insecurity in their attempt to advance right-wing 
politics. 
Boros (2016) observed that the migrant crisis had increasingly 
become a question of solidarity though some continued 
viewing it as an issue of identity, economic threat, and security 
with the anti-migrant, nationalistic mood strengthening 
following the rise of populist politicians, their strength and 
even election to government in 2015/16. Resultantly, a country 
like Hungary, for instance, accepted only a few refugees in 
2015 with the overall social acceptance of pro-refugee policies 
reportedly on the decline. These developments were blamed 
on and largely attributed to the fence erected on the southern 
borders of Hungary, government-funded anti-refugee publicity 
and xenophobic government propaganda (Boros, 2016). 
Sub-Saharan Africa
In Sub-Saharan Africa, wrote Oucho (2009), asylum seekers and 
refugees face serious challenges. Though some of them are 
skilled, well-educated and are professionals, they are reportedly 
working for peanuts since they have little recourse for fear of 
being refouled. Rising unemployment exacerbated by poor 
economic performance has worsened xenophobia in some 
African nations. Some populist politicians have been blamed 
for fuelling xenophobia in these countries. In South Africa, 
Johannesburg Mayor, Herman Mashaba, was accused of inciting 
violence against migrants in Gauteng Province. Reports accused 
Mashaba of saying that illegal immigrants were holding South 
Africa to ransom and that he would be the last South African to 
allow it. Following his remarks, South Africans marched to the 
homes owned by foreign nationals and burnt them under the 
guise of ﬁ ghting drugs and prostitution (Masinga, 2017). Many 
foreigners are now living in fear as a result. 
Implications for the social work profession
In conclusion, it cannot be overemphasised that populist 
politicians are on the rise and that their populist philosophy is 
having serious negative implications on migration governance 
and management. As such, the social work profession should not 
be left out when it comes to addressing the serious challenges 
that populism is causing. Going forward, the social work 
profession is expected to delve deeper in generating knowledge 
on populism and its eﬀ ects on migration. This knowledge will 
undoubtedly deepen our understanding and knowledge of the 
complexities of this phenomenon. It is also expected that social 
work educationists will play a vital role in producing competent 
professionals who will take up leadership positions within 
the professional community. With its focus on the cardinal 
principles of human rights and social justice, there is no doubt 
that the social work profession has an obligation to inﬂ uence 
laws and policies that have a bearing on the social welfare and 
individual wellbeing of migrants and their families. These are the 
opportunities that exist for social workers who dare to make a 
diﬀ erence and leave an indelible imprint in this world. 
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In many European counties, the emphasis on language 
acquisition reﬂ ects populist and nationalistic sentiments 
placing unrealistic pressure on migrants to demonstrate 
their willingness to assimilate and conform to the 
dominant culture and language. The reality is that large 
groups of refugees face server challenges and diﬃ  culties 
when acquiring a second language. The following case 
study illustrates how populist notions as to language 
acquisition must be challenged by social and community 
works dedicated to improve linguistic opportunities for 
Middle Eastern refugees and women in particular.
Refugees in Finland
In 2015 over 32,000 political refugees ﬂ ed to Finland for 
political asylum and every year Eastern Finland receives 
quota refugees. Accurate regional or municipal data on 
refugees granted asylum in Eastern Finland is however 
diﬃ  cult to obtain. National averages indicate that only 
2 % of population in Eastern Finland are immigrants. In 
Eastern Finland, migrant population groups have settled 
mainly in Kuopio, Mikkeli and Joensuu, the biggest cities 
of Eastern Finland.
The research project PROMEQ New Start Finland! 
initially sort to scope the impact of social marketing 
interventions on the health and wellbeing status of 
refugees granted asylum and quota refugees in regional 
Finland. As a result, an intervention involving language 
classes for Middle Eastern women was developed, 
piloted and evaluated. Refugees face signiﬁ cant 
barriers to equity and language acquisition plays a 
critical role in access to educational opportunities, 
employability and social inclusion, which result in 
negative health and wellbeing outcomes (Davidson et 
al. 2008). The eﬀ ectiveness of service interventions to 
meet the needs of new refugees in regional Finland is 
under researched and largely unknown although the 
international literature demonstrates that new and 
more participatory approaches are needed to facilitate 
the integration of new refugees for the mutual beneﬁ t 
of all concerned (Buhin 2012; Kuusela 2014.). 
Language acquisition 
According to Finland’s oﬃ  cial integration strategy, in 
order for immigrants 
to integrate eﬀ ectively, 
refugees must gain 
suﬃ  cient language 
skills for education 
and work. Immigrant 
integration into 
Finnish society is 
steered by the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant 
Integration (Seppelin, 2010) however, the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy admits that not enough 
is known about the eﬀ ect of language acquisition 
on immigrant employment, education and social 
participation. The ability to speak Finnish is instrumental 
for gaining regulated and meaningful employment, 
applying for university courses and extending one’s 
personal and social networks. The Finnish government 
and local municipalities provide language instruction 
for registered refugees. However, access to language 
acquisition is not equal for all refugees. Stay-at-home 
mothers, older refugees and refugees who have recently 
moved to Kuopio from other parts of Finland, experience 
diﬃ  culties accessing courses because they are outside 
the active labour market, not registered for an integration 
plan or just have diﬃ  culty getting motivated. 
The language project PROMEQ New start Finland! 
targeted Arabic speaking refugee women. Refugee 
migration from Arabic countries has increased and 
in 2016, and it is not commonly known that Arabic 
has became the third largest foreign language group 
in Finland, surpassing Somali end English speakers 
population groups (Statistics of Finland 2017). 
Besides knowledge of Arabic, other criteria of the 
inclusion on the PROMEQ New Start Finland! language 
program were as following: 18-65 years old, woman, 
mother of small children (or other reason that has not 
participated in language courses), residing in Eastern 
Finland (pilot took its place in Kuopio) and arrived 
in Finland after 1.1.2014. Acquisition of the Finnish 
language is of vital importance to the social equity and 
most importantly is linked to social connectedness and 
feelings of inclusion. (Ager & Strang 2008.).  Diﬃ  culties 
in language proﬁ ciency is identiﬁ ed as the number one 
problem aﬀ ecting refugee well-being (Watkins, Razee & 
Richters 2012). However learning Finnish is notoriously 
diﬃ  cult for newcomers due the unique origins of the 
language and insuﬃ  cient language and translation 
services. Limited language proﬁ ciency leaves women 
who are mothers or who have domestic responsibilities 
at particular risk of isolation and marginalisation (Riggs 
et al. 2012). It is well is documented that migrant 
women face diﬃ  culties participating in language 
courses. A complex set of gendered, cultural as well as 
socio-political factors, act as barriers for refugee women 
to gain access to language education (Watkins et. al 
2012). Studies (Riggs et. al.2012) have demonstrated 
that refugee women are willing and well-motivated to 
learn, but at the same time ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to attend 
classes, because of domestic and caring responsibilities. 
Other barriers include the availability of culturally 
appropriate childcare and the gender mix of the 
language classes considered inappropriate by the 
women’s husband or other family members. Women 
may also be been concerned that part time study aﬀ ect 
welfare payments. It is common for refugee families to 
prioritize attendance at language classes for the male of 
the family. (Riggs et. al. 2012.) 
Many refugee women from Middle Eastern countries 
have no previous access to formal education and are 
illiterate in their own language. Women’s opportunities 
for education in their country of origin may have been 
limited because of the socio-political situation and 
cultural practices and gendered roles, i.e. traditional 
expectations locate women’s role within the home. 
Besides taking care of children at home, women often 
have the responsibility to take care of elderly relatives 
and manage household ﬁ nances, groceries and 
maintenance. Limited educational experience mean that 
some women many be unfamiliar with basic skills such 
as holding a pen or unable or using a dictionary. Such 
limitations restrict women’s successful engagement 
with formal language programs rolled out by the state 
as part of Finland’s social integration policies. A recent 
study by Naif (2017) found that adult Arab learners´ 
face signiﬁ cant challenges when learning Finnish as 
a second language. Besides diﬃ  culties in grammar, 
reading and writing the lack of communication due to 
the reserved character of Finnish people and diﬃ  culties 
in integrating into Finnish host society are considered 
a problem both in practical learning as well 
as motivation to learn. Communication with 
native speakers is an essential ingredient for 
better second language learning. However, 
communication opportunities with natives are 
rather limited for Arab learners.
Having to adapt to an unfamiliar education 
system with no prior experience, in an 
unfamiliar environment and interacting with unfamiliar 
people, coupled with ongoing emotional and 
psychosocial diﬃ  culties as part the migration process, 
makes formal learning a challenge. (Watkins, et al.  
2012.) 
Description the language program 
New Start Finland’s! language program for women, is 
run in partnership with local services, the City of Kuopio 
and Multicultural Center Kompassi, Settlementt Puijola. 
The aim of the language program is to promote social 
integration through a language acquisition course 
based on social marketing principles.  Social marketing 
is a not only a model of delivery services but involves a 
commitment to the consumer participation including 
the systematic scoping of needs, co-creation of services, 
tailoring of interventions and an understanding of 
the value or evaluation of the common outcomes for 
all concerned (Vaarama et. al. 2016). The language 
program was advertised through Multicultural 
Center Kompassi, Settlementt Puijola programs and 
promoted by the Social Workers, Integration Unit, City 
of Kuopio. The ﬁ rst pilot commenced, May 2017 with 
the recruitment of six Arabic speaking participants with 
assistance from the Kuopio immigration unit social 
workers. Social work involvement made it possible to 
target and reach out to stay-at-home mothers who 
had not had an opportunity to participate to language 
course previously. Recruitment strategy involved inviting 
women personally and oﬀ ering childcare services 
during the course. Multicultural Center Kompassi, 
Settlementt Puijola enlisted Finnish volunteers to prove 
the childcare for participant’s children. Native Finnish 
speakers conducted courses with assistance from 
Arabic interpreters. Using bilingual research assistants 
is an eﬀ ective strategy to achieve cross-cultural linkages 
between professionals and ethnic minority participants 
to ensure their views are heard and needs identiﬁ ed 
(see Lee, Sulaiman-Hill & Thompson 2014).  
In the beginning of the course, goals of the participants 
were elicited using a Goal Attainment Scale (GAS) 
(Turner-Stokes 2009). Participants had the opportunity 
to discuss  their needs and aims with  assistance from 
the Arabic interpreter.  The aim of the GAS was to 
engage and motivate participants to work toward goals 
as well as consider the utility and possibilities of the 
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course. Participants identiﬁ ed goals that were practical, 
including learning daily phrases of Finnish, computer 
use for completing online beneﬁ t applications, reserving 
doctor´s appointment and communicating with their 
children’s teacher. The GAS results informed the 
design of the program. Participants studied the Finnish 
language through diﬀ erent themes through practical 
activities, information sessions and visits. Themes were 
tailored, according to social marketing approach, based 
on the needs and hopes of the participants. Themes 
included health and dental care, hobbies, social services, 
housing counselling, computer training, going to grocery 
store and cooking, learning how to recycle, excursions to 
city library and to language course of Savo Consortium 
of Education. Program of the pilot project was a diverse 
combination of information sessions and language 
learning activities. 
Formal methods of evaluation involved a survey, 
focus groups interviews, feedback discussion and a 
reﬂ ective log completed by the language teacher and 
the professionals involved. The survey recorded any 
changes to women’s self-reported health and well-
being as the result of participation on the 6-week 
course. Focus group interviews provided a more 
descriptive feedback on group processes and strategies. 
The reﬂ ective thoughts and learning from those 
professionals who ran the program were captured 
though the use of monthly reﬂ ective log completed 
by the professionals, together with meetings with the 
research team. 
Picture of the professionals of the language program. In 
front from left to right: Elina Asikainen, Social Worker, 
Integration Unit, City of Kuopio, Anniina Tourunen, 
Language Teacher, Multicultural Center Kompassi, 
Setlementt Puijola and Ilham Lhayati, Counsellor of 
Immigration Support , Integration Unit, City of Kuopio. 
In the back, from left to right: Katja Kiﬂ ie Beka, Social 
Worker, Integration Unit, City of Kuopio and Johanna 
Rastas, Coordinator, Multicultural Center Kompassi, 
Settlementt Puijola.
New Learning and Reﬂ ections 
The ﬁ rst pilot has provided opportunities for new 
learning. The motivation of the refugee women to learn 
a language was high however, it was crucial that the 
course was tailored and supportive to the speciﬁ c needs 
of this group. It is conceivable that participant’s goals 
will change and prospective courses must be responsive 
and ﬂ exible.  The language teacher and professionals 
involved believe that there is a large unmet need for 
similar type programs amongst refugee women who 
have been in Finland for a longer period than three 
years. Contrary to the assumptions of the original 
program participants reported that they would have 
preferred more language learning instead of diverse 
activities combining language learning with information 
sessions. Reﬂ ecting their intense desire to learn the 
language, participants expressed the need to involve the 
Arabic interpreter with them during sessions, so they 
could interact with the teacher i.e. express themselves 
and ask questions. Participants expressed their desire 
to continue language learning and hoped to get access a 
new course as soon as possible. 
Language teachers and professionals involved in the 
program felt that they were eﬀ ective in addressing some of 
the barriers women experience in engaging with language 
courses. The most signiﬁ cant challenge the professionals 
faced in delivering the course was limited time. Program 
activities were time consuming for many reasons e.g. some 
of the participants were illiterate and were not familiar 
with studying or had to feed their babies during the course 
activities. It was felt that a 30 hour program was insuﬃ  cient 
to achieve measurable outcomes given the complex needs 
of group. However pilot, has been signiﬁ cant a trigger for 
exploring and developing alternative course programs. 
Over the next two pilots professional will have the 
opportunity to further develop and improve the program 
using an action learning approach to language teaching. 
The second group starts in autumn 2017. Already the new 
pilot sessions will be lengthened and themes reduced 
to make the course more eﬀ ective to participants. The 
social marketing approach has had a constructive impact 
on the way language courses are being designed and 
delivered to the Middle Eastern refugee women. This study 
conﬁ rms that refugee women wish to learn language for 
very practical everyday activities and results mirror similar 
studies on other countries (Riggs et. al. 2012). 
Conclusion:
This study conﬁ rms that refugee women are best 
motivated to acquire a second language based on very 
practical everyday activities and needs (Riggs et. al. 2012) 
and not the agenda of government or service providers. 
The ﬁ ndings defy populist beliefs that refugee women 
are reluctant, lack motivation to attend programs, or not 
supported by their husbands to attend such courses. 
There is a demand for more customised and facilitated 
language courses for refugee women and other migrant 
groups who have diﬃ  culty accessing standard language 
courses. The growing commodiﬁ cation and politicalisation 
of language courses and programs has meant the unique 
needs of refugee mothers are overlooked, leaving women 
further isolated. Language acquisition is a matter of 
equality and human rights and without the opportunity 
to learning, refugee women’s world may be conﬁ ned to 
the four walls of their home. Watkins et. al. (2012) has 
argued that greater sensitivity to refugees’ backgrounds, 
culture and gender is necessary in all education programs 
working toward a multicultural society. Programs must 
empower and motivate refugee communities, understand 
and sensitively negotiate cultural customs and take into 
account the eﬀ ects of culture, gender and context on adult 
learning. We would suggest that professionals must review 
and question prevailing attitudes toward refugees and 
their established practices and assumptions in relation 
providing services to diverse migrant groups (Watkins et. al. 
2012). Buhin (2012) emphasizes how it is important to keep 
in mind the demographic heterogeneity of refugees when 
creating culturally relevant social interventions to maximize 
the probability of success. It is our experience that social 
marketing approach appears to a responsive approach 
to delivering language services by taking into account 
cultural customs, barriers and needs and by tailoring each 
language services accordingly. 
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Immigrants, Refugees and Asylum 
seekers in the political Landscape:
In 2015, Angela Merkel opened Germany’s doors to 
Refugees and Asylum seekers, in response to the 
Syrian crisis. Since then, Germany had received 441,899 
applications for asylum, a sharp rise compared to 
41,332 asylum applications in 2010 (BAMF, 2016). As 
Chancellor, Angela Merkel has stood ﬁ rm on her politics 
of leaving Germany’s doors open, even as the mood 
in other EU countries (Hungary, Austria, Poland, UK) 
was largely negative with many rejecting the call for 
solidarity and to sharing the task of accommodating 
refugees and asylum seekers. The mainstream reaction 
to refugees/asylum seekers has however not been as 
negative and most Germans seem to support their 
country’s commitment to provide refuge to people 
ﬂ eeing from war and persecution. Germans has 
matched their attitudes with action with huge numbers 
of Germany participating in supporting refugees with 
housing, helping them to integrate, oﬀ ering voluntary 
services as well as donating resources. Nevertheless, it 
is also clear that this refugee inﬂ ux has also led to soul 
searching, recognition of problems and the diﬃ  culties 
of integration and perhaps not surprisingly, while the 
welcome culture still exists, there is also an increasing 
concern about the implications of this on the welfare 
state, housing and infrastructure (Studie Deutsche 
Willkommenskultur, 2017).
In 2015, at the height of the crisis, asylum seekers had 
to be accommodated in emergency shelters temporarily 
set up in sport-halls, churches, schools and hotels 
across the country. There were clearly not enough 
resources to oﬀ er language courses or even to support 
unaccompanied minor asylum seekers appropriately. 
Minor unaccompanied asylum seekers spent days 
in tents and temporary shelters without any access 
to education or other facilities. It was clear that the 
administrative capacity was at its limit and faltering. 
Merkel had famously said ‘wir schaﬀ en das’ (we will 
manage this) but a clear strategy of how this was to be 
managed was unclear. 
In an attempt to further streamline asylum seekers, 
a pact with Turkey was made to limit unaccounted 
refugees from entering Germany and other parts of the 
EU. Furthermore, to further manage the asylum seeking 
process, administratively and ﬁ nancially, Merkel’s 
government further limited support for asylum seekers 
and laid down additional conditions and responsibilities 
on asylum seekers an d refugees in terms of where they 
could live, who could access support for education and 
living, and under what conditions as well as conditions 
under which punitive measures could be taken for 
example: reducing support for lack of participation in 
integration / language courses. Furthermore, attempts 
have been made to categorise countries as ‘safe’ or 
‘unsafe’, such that persons applying from Asylum and 
Refuge could be identiﬁ ed and processed accordingly. 
Finally, there has been increasing commentary in terms 
of what ‘Asylum’ under the law means, including ‘who 
can be legally given asylum’ and attempts have been 
made to categorise diﬀ erent reasons for immigration 
such as: those seeking refuge, those seeking asylum 
and those seeking protection. According to the Federal 
Oﬃ  ce for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), those 
ﬂ eeing political persecution can be granted asylum 
while those ﬂ eeing war are eligible to apply for refuge 
and protection but not necessarily asylum. There are 
thus three diﬀ erent kind of protection that Germany 
oﬀ ers ranging from Refugee protection, Entitlement 
to Asylum and Subsidiary Protection (BAMF, 2016a). 
Recent developments indicate that applicants are more 
likely to receive subsidiary status rather than asylum 
status (Neue Asylpraxis beim BAMF, 2016). Subsidiary 
status, however, limits the period of stay in German, 
access to resources as well as the right to bring families 
to join persons who are in Germany. These measures, 
however, have received much criticism as failing to 
recognise the context of asylum seekers, categorising 
persons in terms of ‘who is and should be protected’ 
and who does not need or should not be protected’ and 
criminalising or punishing them. 
In either case, voices criticising Chancellor Merkels ‘open 
door’ (open to refugees and asylum seekers) policy 
as well as her attempts to manage the situation have 
become louder.
Furthermore, sexual harassment during new Year’s at 
Cologne, terrorist actions perpetrated by supposed 
asylum seekers/refugees have further sensitized the 
German public to the risks of letting refugees into 
the country where complex administrative and legal 
systems make it often diﬃ  cult to recognise possible 
terrorists and to take action against them. Finally, 
the very real diﬃ  culties of integrating people from 
a diﬀ erent culture and land are increasingly coming 
to the fore, posing central questions about German 
identity, culture, what ‘outsiders’ need to adapt and 
should integrate to. This has led to interesting calls for 
debates and ideas of ‘what is German’ and ‘what should 
be German’. However, these debates have become 
increasingly polarised and laced by the inﬂ uence 
of populist ideas that tend to present a German as 
a mono-culture with a particular culture, history, 
tradition and religion, rather than accept Germany as 
a multicultural place with a complex history that many 
diverse people of diﬀ erent religions and ethnicities have 
shaped. 
Based on these ideas, Merkels party colleague and 
Germany’s interior minister, Thomas de Maizière, has 
called for a ‘deutsche Leitkultur’, in which he calls for a 
recognition of particular social norms and actions along 
with the constitution and respect for human rights, that, 
according to Maziere, forms the fundamental basis of 
Germany. Within this context he makes it clear that 
Germans are not ‘Burkha’ (de Maizière, 2017). This was 
heavily criticized with some maintaining that German 
culture is laid in the constitution and others seeing this 
as a guise to further monitor right and Islamist groups 
and stress integration. Merkel’s own statement of what 
German culture is, highlights a multiplicity of cultures, 
historical and regional inﬂ uences (Merkel, 2017).   
With the ruling parties and its members emphasis on 
drawing sharp diﬀ erences between practices of Muslims 
and the general majority population of ‘Germans’, it is 
clear that populism is increasingly becoming visible in 
mainstream politics in Germany, as it is everywhere else 
in the world. A turning point in German mainstream 
politics is also the rise of the extreme right wing party, 
the Alternativ Für Deutschland (AFD). The popularity 
of AFD has risen so much, that polls predict that they 
will enter the German parliament as an opposition 
party in the 2017 German elections in September. 
AFD leaders envision a ‘Germany of Germans!’ They 
oppose immigration, and believe that Germany needs 
to protect its borders from immigrants, including 
refugees. Furthermore, they fear the usurpation of 
German values, culture and history through the inﬂ ux 
of Muslim migrants and refugees, particularly since 
most of the refugees arriving in Germany from Syria 
and Afghanistan are Muslims. Thus AFDs agenda is not 
only racist but very clearly Islamophobic. AFDs leader 
Frauke argued for shooting at refugees at Germany 
border to halt entry of refugees into Germany (German 
right leaning AfD, 2016). AFDs rhetoric often emphasises 
points of diﬀ erence between Muslims and Christian/
German ways of life, and propagate fear of a cultural 
takeover by Islam. They have argued for a ban on the 
head scarf and an insistence that immigrants pledge 
their loyalty to German law and acceptance of German 
ways of life. 
The next upcoming elections in September 2017 in 
Germany, clearly thematises populist notions with 
regards to immigrants, Islam, Asylum seekers and 
so on. Immigrants are portrayed as criminals and 
persons threatening the security of the nation. AFD 
posters juxtapose ‘German’ culture and society against 
‘immigrant’ and ‘Muslim’ societies, they celebrate Bikinis 
as opposed to Burkha’s and hail the reproduction of 
‘German’ kids instead of ‘immigrants’ (Kamann 2017). 
Other parties such as the Left and the main ruling party 
CDU, also vie for resistance against the hate rhetoric 
and seek to promote tolerant living respectively. 
The issue of increasing deportations and deﬁ nitively 
managing Asylum seekers is also a political manifesto 
for the current ruling party Christian Democratic Party 
(CDU) (Merkel’s party) that is set to win. Though right 
wing parties like the AFD are keen to link migration, 
refugees and asylum seekers to security issues, other 
parties have resisted this simplistic connection, even 
though issues of Security, taxation, and beneﬁ ts remain 
important issues in this election. 
The rhetoric against migration 
and asylum seekers in Germany: 
implications for social work. 
The rise of conservatism and nationalism is a visible trend around the world and this 
is often argued to be a response to rising levels of migration and an increasing inﬂ ux 
of refugees and asylum seekers in almost all parts of the world. In this paper, I will 
present how this conservatism and nationalism ﬁ nds political expressions in Germany, 
particularly in view of the recent incoming of refugees and asylum seekers since 2015 
in Germany and the implications of this for social work. 
Dr. Chaitali Das
A line of Syrian refugees crossing the border of 
Hungary and Austria on their way to Germany, 
6 September 2015  Photo: Mstyslav Chernov
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The role of social workers:
Dealing with needs of special groups such as immigrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers has never been an easy 
task. These are cohorts of people with multiple needs, 
little social/emotional support, often traumatised and 
who must navigate their way in a foreign land without 
clear legal status or secured long term perspectives. 
I, myself worked with unaccompanied minor asylum 
seekers for a year, when the initial rise in asylum seekers 
took place in 2015 in Germany. The work was challenging, 
sometimes contradictory and got me to self-reﬂ ect on 
the intersection of immigration, culture, diﬀ erences, 
communication, multiple times. I experienced internal 
racism, frustration, questioned myself multiple times 
when Muslim colleagues and Muslim young people who 
were my clients refused to shake my hand explaining 
that their religion did not allow them to do so as I was 
a woman and that this was a sign of respect that they 
had for me. I participated in discussions as to whether 
a female colleague could wear shorts in summer during 
Ramadan. These led me to self-critique, to question my 
own values, to talk with others, to work constructively 
to ﬁ nd solutions. Whilst this was challenging for me, I 
can imagine that it may be equally or even more diﬃ  cult 
for immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Such 
persons are often voiceless and have little access to 
express themselves in the mainstream culture without 
the potential for being misunderstood. It is not only 
important to hear these voices but also to be able to 
contextualise them. In my opinion, this space is missing. 
It is clear that the road to integration is not easy and 
there are possibilities, successes as well as challenges. 
There is little room to understand these in their totality; 
the view on these issues from multiple perspectives is 
missing. Social workers can and should play a role in 
creating these spaces for such dialogue because they 
are often the ones in direct contact with persons in 
vulnerable situations and are in a position to provide a 
contextualised narrative rather than a seemingly fact 
based argument. I do not think that a one size ﬁ ts all 
solution is possible. We are all too post-modern for 
that. But I do think a dialogue and working together 
constructively is possible. We will deﬁ nitely not always 
agree and we may need to have multiple arguments over 
the same theme without ﬁ nding resolutions but hopefully 
we will learn to live together with our diﬀ erences. I think, 
as social workers, we should encourage participation in 
these encounters.
News such as the establishment of a ‘liberal mosque’ 
in Berlin and more recently planning of a ‘culturally 
sensitive toilet’ in Cologne had become newsworthy. For 
both topics, I believe a contextualisation is necessary 
to understand what happened and the reactions that 
ensued. In my naiveté, I asked an acquaintance who is 
Muslim what she thought of the liberal mosque. She 
asked me what I meant by ‘liberal’, which from what I had 
read meant a mosque where men and women could pray 
together and where a female Imam led the services. She 
answered that her mosque is also ‘liberal’ where men 
and women pray together, though they do not have a 
female Imam, and they had not felt the need to refer to 
themselves as ‘liberal’. This interaction highlighted to me 
the importance of being aware of how the mainstream or 
those in power often deﬁ nes the ‘other’ or the ‘minority’ 
in very limited and problematic ways, limiting the agency 
of minorities to self-deﬁ ne or express themselves beyond 
structures and boundaries imposed by the majority.
Perhaps because of, or even irrespective of political 
personalities and their ideas, I suspect there is a genuine 
desire to understand the ‘other’ and to provide ‘support’. 
However, I suspect that it is not the language that holds 
people and communities apart but simply diﬀ erent 
lifestyles. Indeed, how would I learn about Goths, or 
Punks, if I do not belong to the scene or do not have 
friends who are part of it? I hardly have any idea what 
the lifeworld of German teenagers is, given that no one 
in my circle of acquaintances is a teenager. Acceptance 
of diﬀ erence is crucial in multi-cultural societies – be it 
diﬀ erent ethnic, social or religious. Social workers can 
play a very important role in bringing people together 
for dialogue, simply by creating spaces where people can 
come together. It is clear that it is not one space or one 
format that is required but rather multiple formats and 
multiple spaces at multiple levels. 
I hope social workers can further engage to enable 
reﬂ ection in the population. Social workers do not need 
to provide answers - these answers have to be found 
together in democratic dialogues (Parekh, 2006) that 
may be fundamental to a participatory and deliberative 
democracy. 
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IASSW’s message for peaceful 
engagement with Social Justice, 
opposing and condemning 
intolerance and violence
IASSW opposes and condemns intolerance and violence in all its pernicious and 
evil forms, and condemns those governments, quasi-governments and individuals 
who perpetrate and support intolerance and violence. We condemn people and 
industries that make and sell the weapons and other equipment that allow terrorists 
to carry out their violent intentions. Our condemnation does not change according to 
country, race, ethnicity, religion, or other circumstance. IASSW does support robust 
conversations undertaken in goodwill to address and resolve injustices around 
the world that have grown from years of oppression, colonialism, and religious 
and economic hegemony. The history of oppression, however, cannot in any way 
justify contemporary violence and daily acts of terror which can only perpetuate 
the oppressive cycle of violence, and do nothing to advance social justice or peace. 
The great religions of the world only advocate peaceful resolution of conﬂ ict and 
complaints. Social work educators also teach peaceful engagement for social justice 
in our classrooms, support it in our research, and are prepared to engage with 
anyone of goodwill who is interested in addressing and resolving historical or modern 
grievances with the goal of social justice and an end to oppression in all its forms. 
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Background 
In their discussion of transformation to an equitable 
socio-economic dispensation, Mangaliso and Mangaliso 
(2013) suggest that the dream to abolish apartheid 
would bring prosperity to the majority of South Africans 
has proven to be an elusive one.  The economic power 
still remains concentrated in the same hands in which it 
was concentrated before 1994. In addition, the levels of 
unemployment are growing progressively higher, while 
those of poverty are worsening, particularly for the poor 
black majority. 
Malikane (2017) deﬁ nes radical transformation as 
the product of the output which is produced by 
the economy of a country and existing patterns of 
ownership and control.  The questions which could be 
generated by this assessment concern those who own 
the entities; whose who production makes the most 
signiﬁ cant contributions to the economy; those who 
manages them and those who make decisions about 
investment patterns, employment patterns and rates of 
pay in the labour market. Maserumule (2012) maintains 
that South Africa is in the midst of a battle between 
deﬁ ning a developmental state and a democratic one, 
while the latter goal seems to be the one to which the 
African National Congress (ANC) government is giving 
most of its attention, although it outwardly purports 
to be committed to the emergence of a developmental 
state. The authors of this short article maintain that 
radical transformation is required in South Africa, in 
order to achieve a state which is inclusive, democratic, 
universal and fair- as the only means by which social 
justice is likely to be achieved in South Africa should 
therefore become a moral imperative. 
White monopoly capital and paradoxes 
in institutions of governance 
Southall (2017) maintains that while some would query 
the integrity of the term ‘White Monopoly Capital’ 
(WMC), its introduction to South Africa’s contemporary 
discourse is healthy for politics. This is because it points 
out that the inequalities in terms of wealth, income and 
opportunity are not only extreme but highly racialized. 
The White minority continue to dominate the most 
productive parts of the country. Southall (20170 argues 
that the White minority and their privilege and status is 
behind the anger and frustration felt by most polarized 
black people. This is a frustration that any form of 
politics can take advantage of and manipulate at the 
expense of the needy and vulnerable. 
Southall (2017) maintains that while policies targeting 
equal opportunity and preference to blacks are 
necessary, it however needs attention on addressing 
rampant corruption, promotion of transparency and 
accountability. For example, the Treasury of the country 
has been ﬂ agged for unaccountable millions. The South 
African Police Service (SAPS) is also struggling to secure 
a Police Commissioner for years now as the appointed 
ones end up trapped in criminal cases associated with 
alleged wrong doing. Institutions of governance are 
failing to eﬀ ectively implement social services while 
their purpose is understood, unfortunately reality shows 
something else. Another branch of monopoly if one 
could call it that concerns the alleged state capture by 
the Gupta family. While social work does not concern 
itself with allegations, a key question arises if the 
state capture (whether real or not) will replaces white 
monopoly capital, meaning that one corrupt practice 
is replaced by another.  Based on the ideal of real 
transformation and social development, the best capital 
is inclusive and people centred.  Monyai (2011) points 
out that the paradox of current social policy initiatives  
it is still  the marginalized who are still excluded by 
the apartheid regime even though social policy and 
programmes are claiming to be targeting them. 
The ongoing debate concerning 
decolonisation
The debate concerning decolonisation has swept 
through many of the corridors of learning in South 
Africa, particularly those in the domain of higher 
education. As there is a great deal of confusion 
concerning how the concept should be understood and 
interpreted, there is also a possibility of overlooking the 
‘Other’ (Sewpaul, 2013). As a consequence, endeavours 
to decolonise can arouse intense emotions and be 
perceived as destructive if they are not carried out 
within professional and humane parameters. Essop 
(2016) points out that the decolonisation debate raises 
concerns with respect to the relationship between 
power, knowledge and learning. However, there 
are two categories of dangers which are inherent in 
most decolonising enterprises. The ﬁ rst concerns 
the tendency to prompt racial essentialism, in 
accordance with which white is replaced by black or 
Freud by Fanon. The second concerns manifestations 
of social conservatism, which pit modernity against 
tradition. These dangers can be avoided through an 
acknowledgement and an acceptance of epistemological 
diversity. Broadbent (2017) explains that it would 
require a great deal of thorough critical scrutiny to 
decolonise knowledge in a meaningful sense. Critical 
decolonisation entails accepting the possibility of error 
and also considering whether indigenous knowledge 
systems may contain certain truths which have been 
inaccessible to western science. However, it could also 
entail accepting that indigenous knowledge systems 
may be ﬂ awed or wrong. 
The plight of the poor as a focus for 
political rhetoric and not for actual 
attention
In his discussion of the dilemma which is presented 
by widespread grinding poverty in Africa, Hope (2004: 
127) explains that the poor are aﬄ  icted by a lack of 
purchasing power, a predominantly rural culture, 
exposure to risk, insuﬃ  cient access to social and 
economic services and few opportunities for generating 
incomes in the formal sector. However, it is abundantly 
evident that the plight of the poor becomes an abstract 
political concern in the messages of political parties, 
while their actual concerns are far from those of the 
people on whose behalf they purport to speak from 
their political platforms. A great many people have 
been given cause to wonder how politicians are able to 
continue to deceive large swathes of the populations 
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Introduction 
This paper, endeavours to discuss the populist notion 
of radical transformation and its implications for the 
majority of citizens of South Africa. Among its central 
tenets is the conﬂ ict of interest between the objectives 
of radical transformation and what has been termed 
monopoly capital. It also considers the paradoxes 
which are inherent in institutions of governance and 
the ongoing debate concerning decolonisation. The 
authors endeavour to probe the dichotomy between 
the use which is made of the plight of the poor for 
political gain and the apparent lack of political will to 
take meaningful steps to alleviate it. It concludes with 
a discussion of whether the social work profession 
should also undergo radical transformation. 
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of countries such as South Africa, while doing very little which eﬀ ectively 
alleviates their shared plight. A cynical response to the question may 
suggest that politicians of all ostensible political persuasions feel no 
compassion at all for the poor and simply exploit their plight to garner 
votes for their parties. 
Should social work undergo radical transformation?
In the light of the potential implications of radical transformation for 
the diﬀ erent population groups of South Africa, should the profession 
of social work undergo radical transformation? In its professed desire to 
become a developmental state, the government of South Africa after 1994 
moved from a social welfare approach to a social development one, which 
is deﬁ ned by Midgely, (2013:13) as “a process of planned social change 
designed to promote the well-being of the population as a whole, within 
the context of a dynamic multifaceted development process”. 
The adoption of the approach entailed increased amounts of state funds 
being invested in social grants as a means overcoming poverty. Although 
social grants provide assistance to the poor, their actual value has 
frequently been questioned, mainly in terms of their sustainability, for both 
their intended beneﬁ ciaries and also for the state. This year, for reasons 
which have yet to be properly identiﬁ ed or resolved, the state was unable 
to pay out social grants to those who were eligible to receive them. It is 
from this perspective that Maserumule (2012) maintains that there will 
always be endless conﬂ ict concerning the form which the nation will take 
in the future. The uncertainty which was experienced by the beneﬁ ciaries 
of social grants would inevitably have sent shock waves through their 
perceptions of the sustainability of the measures which the government 
has taken as an expression of its commitment to providing a better life for 
all. 
In the light of the enormous numbers of South Africans who receive social 
grants, it could be asserted that the pressure to provide state funds across 
the sector has proved to be detrimental to the implementation of other 
developmental social services and also to the social work profession. An 
example could be provided by the present state of NGOs in South Africa, 
whose funding the government saw ﬁ t to drastically cut this year, which 
resulted in some retrenching many social workers and many services 
closing down. It could be speculated that the funding of NGOs had been cut 
as a result of the ﬁ nancial burden becoming too great for the state to carry. 
It is in this context that Penderis (2012) asserts that the ﬁ nancial burden of 
social security keeps increasing, to the detriment of other developmental 
social services. The eﬀ ects which are felt by the social work profession are, 
in turn, felt equally acutely by the poorest population groups, which are left 
with very limited access to free social services as a direct consequence.
In the light of the present predicament of the social work profession, it 
could be maintained that if its main thrust were to be transformed to 
embody the objectives of critical social work, the social beneﬁ ts for the 
disadvantaged populations of South Africa could be maximised. There 
is a great need for social workers to understand the position of the 
oppressed in the context of the social and economic structure in which 
they live (Payne, 2015). Sewpaul (2013) maintains that neo-liberalism 
has aﬀ ected small-scale community-based initiatives adversely, leaving 
them without authority to challenge the power of corporate capital, 
centralised governments and big ﬁ nancial institutions. It is for this reason 
that Payne (2015) emphasises that social work practitioners should use 
critical social work to practise in ways which promote social change, 
rather than conﬁ ning all their eﬀ orts and activities to problem solving 
and empowerment. Critical social work strives to achieve social justice 
and to challenge oppressive systems in societies. It also encompasses 
an understanding that in its endeavour to remedy the plight of the 
marginalised, radical transformation also has the potential to create other 
groups of marginalised people. 
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Introduction
Not so long ago, political commentators 
conﬁ dently declared that Western economic 
and political liberalism had triumphed 
and that viable systemic alternatives had 
been exhausted. The victory of Western 
consumerism was interpreted as “an endpoint 
in mankind’s ideological evolution” signalling 
an “end of history” (Fukujama, 1989). It was 
just a matter of time until Western liberal 
democracy would aﬃ  rm itself as the “ﬁ nal 
form of human government” (Fukujama, 
1989). The two major ideological challenges 
to liberal democracy – communism and 
fascism – no longer harboured popular 
appeal – communism because its lack of 
viability and fascism because of its lack of 
success (Fukujama, 1989). Fast forward two 
decades and the faith that some placed in 
the political force of liberal ideology seems 
to have been utterly misplaced. The ‘Arab 
Spring’, while at least initially giving rise to a 
range of democratic processes, ushered in a 
clash between communal, liberal, and populist 
religious factions that, aided by opposing 
geopolitical forces, annihilated tens of 
thousands of civilians and returned to rubble 
artefacts of ancient and modern civilisations. 
Citizens in Eastern Europe and Russia have 
seen a hollowing out of democratic processes 
and institutions and the rise of nostalgic 
forces that mourn the loss of a competing 
teleology featuring a strong state that protects 
citizens from the avarice of the free market. 
Even in Western Europe and North America, 
the bastions of liberal and social democracy, 
an increasing number of citizens no longer 
regard it as essential to live in a country 
governed democratically (Foa & Mounk, 2016). 
The rise of conservative nationalist populism 
in countries such as the United States, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Switzerland, England, Italy, and Scandinavia is 
increasingly perceived as a threat to the very 
liberal democratic fabric that only two decades 
ago seemed to be on the verge of becoming 
what Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan termed ‘the 
only game in town’ (Linz & Stepan, 1996).
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What happened? 
A growing number of observers agree that we are 
witnessing a deconsolidation of liberal democracy 
(Foa & Mounk, 2016). That is, a growing number of 
citizens no longer believe that liberal democracy is 
the best way to govern a country and are increasingly 
tempted to embrace authoritarian alternatives. Indeed, 
some observers fear that this deconsolidation could 
endanger even wealthy and stable democracies that 
were, until recently, regarded as ‘safe’ (Foa & Mounk, 
2016). Explanations as to why liberal democracies 
are deconsolidating focus on its inability to ensure 
material stability or continuity of culture and tradition. 
The former line of argument holds that economic 
and political liberalism have been too successful. 
That is, neo-liberalism aggressively undermined the 
tripartite agreement that mitigated the conﬂ ict between 
labour and capital and formed the basis of social 
democracies. Deregulation and austerity measures, 
the economic remedies of a post-Keynesian ‘welfare’ 
state now prescribed by parties on both sides of the 
political spectrum, render the lives of ordinary citizens 
increasingly precarious, unstable, and competitive. As a 
result, citizens ﬁ nd themselves less and less represented 
by established political parties. With a diminishing stake 
in liberal democracy, citizens ﬁ nd themselves more 
and more prepared to forgo human rights as well as 
democratic, and pluralist ideals in favour of ideological 
alternatives that promise easy solutions (Lanzone & 
Woods, 2015; McSwiney & Cottle, 2017). 
Other commentators highlight the perceived threat to 
culture and tradition pointing at the rise of xenophobia 
in ethnically relatively homogenous communities 
faced by the arrival of immigrants and refugees groups 
dislodged by globalisation. As some have pointed 
out, this culturally defensive populism can take ultra-
nationalist forms that radically re-shape ‘civil’ society 
turning it into a ‘surveillance’ society that monitors 
population groups that are earmarked to be ‘diﬀ erent’ 
for breaches of cultural norms (Fazzi, 2015). With 
people’s ‘way of life’ under threat, ethnic and social 
minorities become the target for scrupulous politicians 
who channel anger and frustration at the status quo 
(Altman, 2017) and who build their political platforms 
around the destruction of the inclusive welfare state 
turning universal entitlements into privileges of 
increasingly restrictive citizenship (Standing, 2011). 
Another relatively novel line of exploration focuses 
on the impact of new forms of communications and 
particularly social media (Das, 2017; Dittrich, 2017; 
Speed & Mannion, 2017). This embryonic body of 
work posits that rhizomic, non-hierarchical forms of 
knowledge (Guattari, 1972) attached to social media 
can be manipulated so that they, charged with post 
truth facts, aﬃ  x themselves to hierarchical machineries 
of ‘knowledge’ production whose structures are often 
barely visible to social media consumers. Further, social 
network members linked by social media cluster more 
readily around anti-establishment issues and can be 
more easily identiﬁ ed, accessed, and mobilised by 
political entrepreneurs (Dittrich, 2017). In the absence 
of editorial policies and a lack of fact checking, social 
media content tends to be more readily aligned with 
networks associated with populist causes than with 
centrist ideologies (Hendrickson & Galston, 2017; Page & 
Dittmer, 2016). 
Nationalist Populism and Social Work 
The nexus between nationalist populism and social 
work has been poorly explored. Indeed, few researchers 
have systematically researched the phenomenon. This 
is surprising given the fact that the growing popularity 
of nationalist populism rhetoric clearly signals that this 
brand of populism is a force that is intent on sweeping 
away the universality of human rights. It re-deﬁ nes how 
the crumbs that are available under the neo-liberal 
welfare state are to be distributed.  This proposition 
shakes the very foundations of social work. To illustrate 
the point, Luca Fazzi’s research (2015) focusing on the 
rise of nationalist populism in northern Italy is worth 
summarising. According to Fazzi, the political success 
of nationalist populist Northern League led to a ‘re-
targeting’ of welfare where access to social services 
by ethnic or social minorities is becoming increasingly 
restricted (Fazzi, 2015). As a result, essential services 
such as housing, income support, and early childhood 
services are delivered on an ‘our people ﬁ rst’ basis. 
Luca Fazzi’s account also describes the rise of overtly 
racist institutions and vigilante groups that are created 
to denounce infringements against cultural norms and 
to protect neighbourhoods against crime committed 
by ‘illegal immigrants’ (Fazzi, 2015). As the populist 
message highlighting the threat of an “invasion of 
immigrants” is increasingly absorbed by the local 
population, social workers ﬁ nd it more and more 
diﬃ  cult to activate informal support for migrants (Fazzi, 
2015). The departure from humanitarian principles and 
universal social rights to a system of welfare based on 
the political ideology and clientelism impacts directly on 
the professional practice of social workers employed 
by administrations in these areas (Fazzi, 2015). Fazzi 
outlines four distinct responses by social workers to 
these changes: supporters of the new administration, 
the passively dissatisﬁ ed, the pragmatists, and the 
activists. Fazzi highlights that less educated and 
less experienced social workers employed by small 
municipalities tend to be among the supporters and 
passively dissatisﬁ ed. Pragmatists and activists, on the 
other hand, tend to have specialist training had more 
experience, are skilled in creating alliances, and have 
larger networks. Social work activists could be mainly 
found in medium-sized or large municipalities (Fazzi, 
2015). Fazzi warns that if not countered populism, 
in combination with neo-liberal austerity has an 
astonishing capacity to reshape social work culture 
(Fazzi, 2015). 
What is to be done?
This raises the question how nationalist populism can 
be countered. For progressive political observers, the 
answer rests with a radical reworking of democracy that 
harks back to John Dewey’s political experimentalism 
that sees political procedures and institutions as being 
permanently constructed as they are justiﬁ ed only as long as they 
fulﬁ l their purpose (Dewey, 1927). The rise of populist nationalism 
seems to indicate that it is time to, in Dewey’s sense, re-shape 
political institutions and re-deﬁ ne citizenship to make them more 
representative. It may well be that mechanisms that allow for 
more direct access to the political system, such as DemocracyOS, a 
grassroots approach based  on an App allowing its users to deliberate 
and vote on political issues, and its associated Net Party in Buenos 
Aires will form part of a re-invented State. It is also possible that 
political parties will have to be reformed to allow for grassroots 
participation that extends beyond canvassing and donations. While 
changes at the systemic level will be crucial to counter the rise of 
nationalist populism, social workers need to think about strategies 
at the mezzo and micro level of professional practice. Fazzi’s account 
(2015) highlights the role of social workers as moral and political 
agents making the point that social work education should include 
solid grounding in professional ethics as well as preparation in 
dealing with populist doctrines which would include pedagogical 
emphasis on community development and activism. Clearly, 
grounding social work practice in human rights (Gray & Webb, 2013) 
and anti-oppressive theory (Dominelli, 2002) and directing it towards 
activism (Noble, 2007) is crucial for novice social workers who ﬁ nd 
themselves within a context that challenges the core values of an 
inclusive society. Beyond a pedagogical approach, however, those 
working in the heartland of nationalist populism will ﬁ nd it useful 
to be supported by a network of like-minded, experienced social 
workers. The rise of national populism signals that now is the time to 
forge such networks and create linkages with civil society. 
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Introduction
In recent years, we have seen the rise of right-wing populism across Europe and more recently 
in the United States following the election of Donald Trump on November 8, 2016. A decade 
after the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis, the reality has shown that the economic and ﬁ nancial failure 
across Western industrialized societies have paved the way to political populism, militarization, 
surveillance and social control by law enforcement as a consequence of the failure of the 
current social order.
This article explores the dynamics behind political populism, in particular right-wing populism 
and its links to bigotry, hate, racism, xenophobia, and islamophobia. It deﬁ nes the values and 
commitments of social work and encourages social workers to speak up and denounce all 
kinds of violations and to uphold the dignity of people, social justice and human rights.
Under right-wing populism, the challenges have been rising to social work. The world is 
changing and the nature of social work must also change. The system is broken and those at 
the margins are calling for social work advocacy and activism, of their behalf. The patriarchal 
neoliberal ideology and its capitalist 
wave, the politics of austerity, the 
violation of human rights, gender-
based violence against women and 
towards the LGBTQ community, 
the recent rise of bigotry, hate, 
xenophobia and racism fueled 
by right-wing political populism 
across diﬀ erent  Western nations, 
the backlash against refugees 
and migrants moving across 
international borders who are 
ﬂ eeing from conﬂ ict and persecution 
or other life-threatening situations, 
and the violations of Indigenous 
rights and natural sources pose a 
tremendous challenge for social 
work (Duarte, 2017).
21st Century: The Revival 
of Right-Wing Populism
The post-cold war period based on 
the principles of multiculturalism, 
immigration, universalism, human 
rights, peace and prosperity has 
come to an end. Since the 9/11 
events, the declaration of war on 
“Islamic” terrorism has given rise to 
a series of events of ethnic-religious 
violence. The hostility towards 
Muslims and the increase of social 
control measures have imposed a 
“surveillance society” and sentiments 
of insecurity and public fear led 
to the demise of the principles of 
democracy and human rights (Fazzi, 
2015).
Following the cuts in the welfare 
state and the unprecedented 
rise of unemployment which 
occurred since the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis, but also as 
a result of the refugee crisis imposed by the Syrian 
conﬂ ict, mainstream society across Western countries, 
particularly in Europe and the United States, started 
labelling Muslims, migrants and refugees as dangerous 
and undeserving.
The populist messages have been fuelled by politicians 
and conservative right-wing ideology, intended to 
legitimise the idea of superiority based on a certain 
ethnic and cultural origin, and characterised by a 
rhetoric of discrimination, bigotry, hate, racism and 
xenophobia which violates the principles of human 
rights and social justice.
Populism can be deﬁ ned as a political style that pits 
people against the status quo (Judis, 2016a). The 21st 
century political populism has its roots in the 19th 
and 20th centuries. Throughout the history, political 
populism has always had a surge in the wake of 
economic recessions. Certainly, it cannot be deﬁ ned 
exclusively in terms of right, left or centre. It includes 
both. Undoubtedly, there are right-wing, left-wing and 
centrist populist parties. Thus, in general, populism 
can be deﬁ ned as a political logic – a way of thinking 
about politics. For the American historian Michael Kazin, 
populism is a kind of language used by politicians to 
speak with ordinary people, as if these people were a 
noble assemblage, not bounded narrowly by class. So, in 
the 21st century, what distinguishes left-wing populists 
such as Bernie Sanders (United States), Jeremy Corbyn 
(United Kingdom), Alexis Tsipras (Greece), Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon (France) and Pablo Iglesias (Spain) from 
right-wing populists such as Donald Trump (United 
States), Marine Le Pen (France) and Nigel Farage 
(United Kingdom) among others in Eastern Europe? 
The left-wing populists champion the people against 
the elite or establishment that hold or impose a system 
of oppression. Normally they tend to advocate for 
people’s rights, and raise the critical consciousness of 
society against the status quo. The right-wing populists 
champion the people against the elite or establishment 
by accusing them of favouring a third group such as 
immigrants (in general), Muslims, Jews, refugees or 
simply people of African origin or from other ethnic 
minorities. Right-wing populists also tend to accuse and 
discriminate other minority groups such as those who 
represent the LGBTQ people (Judis, 2016a; 2016b).
My aim here is to talk about right-wing populism as it 
is the one that poses challenges for social work and 
undermines the values of human rights and social 
justice. Right-wing populism has been a warning sign 
of a political and economic crisis. It aims to divide, not 
unify. It defends and expresses a set of moral values by 
assuming they serve all people. Therefore, the climate of 
intolerance across diﬀ erent Western countries has been 
exacerbated by right-wing political populism, such as 
the one put forth by Donald Trump in the United Sates 
or Marine Le Pen in France.
The Social Work Response
The foundational values of human rights and social 
justice have always been the core ideals and “right 
principles” of social work. Social workers are committed 
to promote human rights, social justice and address the 
root causes of poverty, oppression and inequalities. The 
“Global Agenda” launched in 2012 by the International 
Federation of Social Workers (IFSW), the International 
Association of Schools of Social Work (IASSW), and 
the International Council on Social Welfare (ICSW) has 
reinforced this commitment (IFSW, IASSW & ICSW, 2012).
The global deﬁ nition of social work (IFSW, 2014) 
approved by the IFSW General Meeting and by the 
IASSW General Assembly in July 2014 which occurred 
in Melbourne, Australia, deﬁ nes social work as a 
“practice-based profession and an academic discipline 
that promotes social change and development, social 
cohesion, and the empowerment and liberation of 
people. Principles of social justice, human rights, 
collective responsibility and respect for diversities are 
central to social work. Underpinned by theories of 
social work, social sciences, humanities and indigenous 
knowledge, social work engages people and structures 
to address life challenges and enhance wellbeing” (IFSW, 
2014).
Filipe Duarte 
School of Social 
Work, Carleton 
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Lundy (2011, p. 52) reminds us that “social workers such as Jane Addams, 
Bertha Reynolds, Sophonisba Breckinridge, and Mary van Kleeck were 
leaders in the early human rights movements”, and in the political and 
social work activism (Duarte, 2017).
In the 21st century, social workers are the biggest organized social 
movement in the world concerned with the principles of social justice, 
human rights and self-determination. Undoubtedly, social workers play 
a crucial role in inspiring others and can also force issues on the political 
agenda, turning the impossible into the inevitable. Social work is rooted 
in community organisation and social activism.
Therefore, as social workers are positioned inside complex and refractory 
social relations, they must variously speak up at political and public 
arenas against discrimination, bigotry, racism, xenophobia, hate and 
islamophobia in accordance with human rights principles and their own 
social work values and commitments (Duarte, 2017).
Fazzi (2015, p. 603) identiﬁ es four strategies of active resistance used 
by social work activists which can be employed at moments of right-
wing populism: (1) exploitation of the margins of discretion of the public 
professionals who have the task of putting decisions taken at a political 
level into practice and work directly with those groups of people; (2) 
increase trade union political commitment; (3) build alliances within the 
third sector and civil society; and (4) establish dialogue with political 
actors and parties.
The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) in the United States has also 
recently published a community resource called “Ten Ways to Fight Hate” 
(SPLC, 2017). Following the strategies proposed in Fazzi’s study, this 
guide can also be used by social workers to uphold human rights and 
social justice, promote tolerance and inclusion. The 10 principles are: act; 
join forces; support the victims of those vulnerable; speak up; educate 
yourself; create an alternative; pressure leaders; stay engaged; teach 
acceptance and dig deeper.
These strategies and principles can attract a wider support in order to 
overturn peoples’ consciousness and right-wing populism. Social workers, 
in collaboration with other allies, can be a vital force in advancing human 
rights and a social justice agenda (Lundy & van Wormer, 2007).
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In some ways I have approached this blog post intrigued 
by Martin Buber’s thought about history’s claim on each 
person and each new generation (Friedman, 1991).  What 
might history, right now, in this moment of right-wing 
populism, require of community development?
The problem of ‘sham’ right wing 
populism
Right-wing nativist populism (most recently seen in Trump’s 
election, Brexit in the UK and the revival of Pauline Hanson 
in Australia), which I refer to here as ‘sham populism’, 
rejects liberal democracy (Altman, 2017) with its ideals of 
protecting minority rights, avoiding ‘majority’ rule. Sham 
populism stands for:
An animating force fuelled by anger directed at elites who 
have betrayed the people and against threatening out-
groups;
Removing doubt in a complicated world – transforming 
complexity and ambiguity in political controversies into a 
search for enemies; and,
A political style, which matches intolerance of various 
groups (mainly immigrants) with a style of confronting 
argument – where oﬀ ensiveness seems to imply 
authenticity (Tiﬀ en, 2017).
I am not suggesting the left can’t also get caught in sham 
populism – as we see in Venezuela right now for example. 
But it’s more often the political right at this historical 
moment.
Community Development and ‘sham’ 
populism
Many people in the community development world share 
the concerns of contemporary sham populisms – we 
mistrust elites and institutions of liberal democracy (media, 
political parties, even the state, as many aspects of the 
state are captured by corporations), and many of us have 
been angry and anxious about the future.
Yet, I hope that we do not share the same narrow response 
and are able to hold a more nuanced understanding of 
‘the state’ and ‘the media’, avoiding totalising narratives 
and recognizing the pluralistic dimensions – that there are 
many diverse players within the state and media, partly 
allies in our work, not simply enemies.
Community development has also been enriched by the 
notion of ‘the popular’ as in Paulo Freire’s radicalising of 
adult education. ‘Popular’, particularly the Latino version of 
the word, equates to ‘the people’s education’ – education 
‘for the people, by the people, with the people’. Freire’s 
popular education is dialogical, committed to ‘love, and 
A Community Development response to 
‘Sham’ right-wing populism
To be clear about my position, alluding to Ian Hyslop’s recent blog 
on social work, there’s no ‘essence’ of community development, 
no community development ‘as a thing’. There are diverse theories 
and practices that co-exist in tension with one another, producing 
speciﬁ c types of practice in diﬀ erent contexts. Community 
development can be oriented in conservative, pluralist and radical 
directions (Gilchrist, 2004). I will argue for a radical orientation.
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The white nationalist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia over this 
last weekend is an important moment in American politics, 
symbolizing the ascendance of the reactionary right and 
showcasing the dangers of its toxic assault on democracy, 
equality and the rule of law.  News outlets on early Sunday 
reported that one person was killed on August 12th after a car 
accelerated into a crowd of counter-protestors, while dozens 
more were injured.  That intimidation, terror, and murder are 
tools of the reactionary right in their war on people of color 
and non-Christians is nothing new in history.  Still, the most 
recent wave of right-wing hate is instructive, oﬀ ering numerous 
lessons regarding the state of American politics.
Fascism Here We Come: the Rise of the 
Reactionary Right and the Collapse of “The Left”
Anthony DiMaggio
Lehigh University
Photo by Alec Perkins | CC BY 2.0
humility’, which is nothing like the anger and deception that is central to contemporary right-wing 
sham populism.
Community development theory and practice can oﬀ er an alternative vision of popular education 
and development, inclusive of structural analysis, making sense of complexity, and oﬀ ering 
concrete hope in the form of action (not just rage). Possibly, the problem is that as community 
development theorists and practitioners we’ve oﬀ ered little. Co-opted by a social planning and 
social service approach to community development, or conservative or reformist traditions at best, 
we have not been at the table with those who feel disenfranchised and are easily manipulated. 
To be at the table – a radical community development agenda
First, clarity about the important site of ‘community’ as a place of struggle. The French philosopher 
Jacques Derrida argues that ‘community’ is a signiﬁ cant site of struggle – there are people who 
want sharper boundaries, excluding ‘the other’, and those for hospitality. So, one of the elements of 
radical community development, is that workers get into the local trenches and get involved in the 
struggle for hospitality, and against those who advocate exclusions.
Second, there is a crucial role for community-based education and learning. When I was 19 years 
old I went to the Philippines and lived in a shanty town. I reﬂ ected on the question, ‘Can there be a 
just revolution?’ (an assignment for university then) and during my inquiry I learned of the 20 years’ 
work of the Catholic/Base Christian Community movement, which invested in mass community-
based popular education work, preparing the people for the revolution against Marcos. That was 
when I saw the power of non-formal, community-based education (Westoby & Shevellar, 2012).
Later, as a lover of cooperatives, I studied the Mondragon federation in the Basque country, Spain. 
The Mondragon co-operative movement has been an inspiration to co-operators around the world, 
with 85,000 member-workers in 120 cooperatives currently (Ranis, 2016). The unseen work is the 
time invested by Catholic Priest Father Arizmendi. He started community work in the region in 
1941, yet only established the ﬁ rst co-operative in 1956. The in-between years were spent initiating 
community ventures, crucially facilitating more than two thousand study circles. It was in the 
context of such study circles that the Basques learnt how to [re]create themselves as associational 
people. Radical community development workers need to do popular education – creating space 
and places for people to learn.
Third, building a counter-veiling organisational force. Popular education is not just about learning, 
it’s about collective organising. Organising is crucial as a means of building a counter-veiling force in 
the ‘paradigmatic politics of community’.
 I recently read the story of Nowra, just south of Sydney, in the Griﬃ  th Review (Adcock, 2017). Many 
people who’d lost their homes moved into the town showgrounds where they could camp for free 
and access toilets, showers, even power. Eventually locals organised to have them removed. In 
the Griﬃ  th Review account, there was a vocal council meeting where angry ‘anti-homeless’ people 
forced the Mayor to act on their behalf. There was no organised counter-veiling force. No-one 
had done this work. All the local ‘service providers-community development workers’ had been 
co-opted into service-delivery work. Radical community development needs to shift from service 
delivery to building organised counter veiling forces to ﬁ ght for minority interests.
Such organising also needs to be linked to trans-local work. In Queensland, we call this meta-level 
work – forming networks, federations, and coalitions to ensure local issues are also articulated into 
policy-oriented trans-local activity. Increasingly this work also needs to enter the local-global nexus. 
One recent example of this is the formation of the New Economy Network Australia (NENA), where 
at last local experiments in social-solidarity economy are being connected, and we are organising 
nationally and internationally.
In conclusion
Community is still a profound site of struggle. It is where much embodied violence and 
exclusion occurs. We need to be clear that populist right-wing sham nativism is destructive, 
but that populism isn’t all bad. Popular education initiatives have the potential to revive the 
radical education tradition in community development.
We also need to build an organising program as a counter-veiling force against those who love 
hate, and are willing to use violence, who opt for simple lies, and who don’t want to engage 
complexity. 
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First, the incident reveals that right-wing fascism has 
oﬃ  cially “arrived” on the American political scene, 
as seen in Trump’s refusal to condemn the murders.  
Trump knows he can’t aﬀ ord to alienate racist elements 
on the right to get re-elected, and he doesn’t want to 
alienate them, since he himself is a racist and a bigot.  
Hence the refusal to use clear lanaguage to condemn 
the murders.  His political reasoning here is completely 
transparent, as he’s spent his entire political career 
cultivating hate on the reactionary right.  Although 
Trump eventually condemned the attack after receiving 
a large amount of negative press, his reversal is part of 
a broader trend Trump is known for, in which he initially 
signals to racists in his support base that he approves 
of their actions, thereby devaluing any later reversal as 
merely the product of political pressure, rather than 
principled opposition.  The damage, of course, has 
alredy been done.  Far-right fascists and racists know 
that the president supports their behavior when he goes 
out of his way to provide them cover.
The second lesson from this tragedy relates to the 
futility of claims that Trump and his far-right supporters 
are the sort of people with which “the left” should be 
working.  First, there’s the claim among numerous “left” 
pundits that Trump’s campaign represented the rise 
of working class populism, the implication being that 
Trump himself was a working class hero set on restoring 
America’s past economic greatness.  Other nonsense 
abounded about Trump the principled anti-imperialist, 
but that rhetoric is contradicted by his administration’s 
beliggerent rhetoric and nuclear threats toward 
North Korea, his militarism in Syria, and his embrace 
of increased sanctions against Russia.  The rhetoric 
about Trump the economic populist is contradicted 
by his record since taking oﬃ  ce of embracing typical 
corporatist Republican policies, incuding deep cuts in 
social welfare spending, deregulation of big business, 
and eﬀ orts to ram through tax cuts for the wealthy.
It would be silly and wrong to say that all Trump 
supporters are right-wing fascists or extremists.  Many 
are simply conservatives who do not embrace racism 
or bigotry. According to data from the Pew Research 
Center and elsewhere, while two-thirds to three 
quarters of Trump supporters embrace reactionary and 
bigoted social views, the quarter to third do not.  Still, 
the recent push among numerous “leftists” to seek an 
alliance between the left and the far right (a “Brown-
Red” alliance) is worrisome considering the growing data 
suggesting the right-wing elements of Trump’s support 
base are out-and-out fascists.
Three recent surveys raise alarm bells on the Trump-
fascist front.  First, there was a poll reported in the 
Washington Post which found that a plurality of Trump 
voters believed that white Americans face “a lot of 
discrimination” in the United States.  Comparatively, 
just 19 percent said “Latino people” face “a lot of 
discrimination,” while just 22 percent felt the same 
about “black people.”  These results suggest mass 
delusion on the part of much of Trump’s base, 
considering the mountain of social science data 
demonstrating that people of color are systematically 
discriminated against in the mass media, on the job 
market, in the criminal justice system, and in other 
social settings.  This paranoia is no doubt feeding the 
reactionary right’s escalation of the “culture war” against 
people of color.
A second recent poll suggests that much of Trump’s 
support base has fallen into a cultish relationship 
with the president, expressing a blind trust for “The 
Donald” and authoritarian contempt for the press.  
As the Economist reports, nearly half of Republican 
Americans now believe that the government should 
“shut down” news media outlets for “broadcasting 
stories that are biased or inaccurate,” while over half 
think these outlets should be ﬁ ned for allegedly pushing 
falsehoods – the First Amendment be damned.  If 
these reactionaries get their way, government will be 
empowered to decide what constitutes responsible 
or accurate journalism.  Cultish support for Trump is 
most evident in the Economist’s polling of trust for 
Trump, in comparison to trust of various media outlets.  
Three-quarters of Republicans state they trust Trump 
more than each of the following news outlets: CNN, 
the New York Times, and the Washington Post.  While 
conservatives have long lambasted these outlets for 
their alleged liberal bias, the same cannot be said for 
other outlets, including the neoconservative Weekly 
Standard and the National Review.  But three-quarters 
of Republicans say they have more trust in Trump than 
these outlets.  More than half of Republicans express 
greater trust in Trump than Fox News.
Mass blind trust in a political leader – especially a 
con-man as narcissitic, duplicitious, and shamelessly 
deceptive as Trump – raises dire concerns about the 
ability of critical literacy skills to survive moving forward.  
When citizens favor blatant propaganda as their primary 
source of information about the world, there is little 
hope that they will be able to separate themselves from 
reactionary, oﬃ  cially-endorsed fascism.  The cult of 
Trump will provide cover for an administration that has 
long expressed contempt for freedom of the press, and 
is now indicating its support for fascist policies aimed 
at criminalizing journalists for reporting on classiﬁ ed 
intelligence the Trump administration would prefer be 
kept secret.
A ﬁ nal red ﬂ ag is raised regarding a new poll reported 
on by the Washington Post, which ﬁ nds that 52 percent 
of Republicans would support postponing the 2020 
presidential election if Trump says it is necessary to 
root out voter-fraud before allowing a vote, while 56 
percent say that shutting down elections is acceptable 
so long as Republicans in Congress agree.  No matter 
that Trump has presented no evidence of rampant voter 
fraud in the last election, or that the political experts 
who actually study the issue conclude that voter fraud 
amounts to a miniscule and trivial amount of all votes 
cast.  In a political world in which Lord Trump’s word is 
gospel, and media outlets challenging his propaganda 
are heretics, the truth no longer matters.
The organized left has been in serious trouble for years, 
which is evident in the decline of labor unions, the 
disappearance of leftist public intellectuals in academia, 
the rightward drift of the Democratic Party, and the 
complete failure of the Green Party to make inroads 
with the mass public.  There are of course some positive 
signs, as seen in the rise of Black Lives Matter and 
protests against the Trump administration – particularly 
those protests that provide a constructive agenda by 
supporting greater government funding for education 
and the introduction of universal health care.
Despite these positive developments, much of “the 
left” – if one could call them that, have turned to 
increasingly desperate statements and actions in an 
eﬀ ort to become relevant again to American politics.  
This desperation manifests itself in numerous forms.  
First, there is the trend toward dealing with the Trump 
administration and reactionary supporters with kid’s 
gloves, downplaying the importance of the right’s 
bigotry and prejudice, as seen not only in racist and 
xenophobic rhetoric, but policies that discriminate 
against Muslims, people of color, and immigrants.  Some 
have claimed that Trump should be supported by leftists 
because of his election rhetoric about returning jobs to 
America, in opposition to free trade, and in support of 
normalizing relations with Russia.  None of this rhetoric 
has manifested itself in tangible policy proposals or 
actual policies, now more than half a year into this 
administration, which is a sign of how little commitment 
Trump had to these positions.  As it’s become harder 
and harder to maintain the myth that Trump’s electoral 
victory was a product of mounting anger among a 
working class left behind in the era of outsourcing and 
free trade, some on “the left” have tried to promote a 
“Brown-Red” alliance agenda by claiming that the far 
right can join with the far left to ﬁ ght oppression and 
defeat the liberal media and the “deep state.”
Now some Green Party personalities and some of their 
“public intellectual” supporters who are nominally 
on the left seek to make common cause with openly 
white nationalist reactionaries.  This development 
demonstrates a serious intellectual decline in what 
counts for “the left.”  By downplaying the severity of the 
racist, sexist, classist, and xenophobic tendencies of 
the far-right and the reactionary elements of Trump’s 
base, individuals who claim to support the left betray 
the long history of resistance to bigotry, prejudice, and 
oppression that has historically deﬁ ned progressive 
social movements.  Any sane person should want to 
have nothing to do with right-wing bigots or fascists, 
although this point has been obscured in talk of a 
“Brown-Red” alliance.
The decision by Cobb and McKinney to ally with fascists 
is a serious betrayal of progressive values.  It harms 
the credibility of anyone on the left who still claims 
the mantle of the democratic, anti-racist politics.  The 
Green’s alliance will not be forgotten by people of color, 
immigrant rights groups, and those opposing America’s 
Islamophobic turn. One can’t realistically “work with” 
right-wing nationalists one minute, then claim common 
cause with minority groups that are the targets of 
reactionary fascists.
Much of what remains of “the left” today is comprised 
of anxious, angry individuals who are rightly angry at 
a dysfunctional political-economic system that fails to 
represent the needs of the bottom 99 percent.  These 
individuals often feel deeply isolated from American 
mainstream society, and unfortunately, have been 
willing to gravitate toward all types of kooky ideas 
due to the decline of left-public intellectualism in the 
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The following topics are merely a guide:
• Health inequalities and social policy i.e. human rights, 
personalisation and consumer choice, organisational 
contexts, health care costs and funding  
• Specialist ﬁ elds of practice i.e. hospital social work, 
rehabilitation and ambulatory care, mental health, 
child and family health, youth health, palliative care, 
trauma work, community and public health care, aged 
and dementia care, migrant and refugee health 
• Ethics and values in health care, cultural tensions and 
controversies   
• New practices and use of technologies in health and 
home care, interdisciplinary teamwork and decision-
making and health and social management
• Educating and supporting health care practitioners 
and emerging theories in health care
Instructions
Manuscripts are to be submitted as academic articles 
in the range between 5,000 – 10,000 words (including 
its title, biography, abstracts, key words, the main body, 
list of sources, explanatory notes). See the website for 
further details on the format (http://socialniprace.cz/
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All submissions must include discussion of implications 
for social work practice, education, research, theory or 
ethics at the individual, community or policy level. We 
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Editor, Janet Anand, Professor in International Social 
Work, University of Eastern Finland at 
janet.anand@uef.ﬁ    
We are also looking for book reviews and research notes.
Book review is the standard literary genre. So please 
observe all review requirements. In the end of review 
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the book contribute to social work, respectively to social 
workers and workers in practice, education or research?” 
Scope of review is set at 1,000 – 2,000 words. Reviews 
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A call for papers for the English edition of the journal Czech 
and Slovak Social Work (ERIS Journal)
The journal Czech and Slovak Social Work invites submissions for a special edition on Social Work in Health 
Care Settings, Summer 2018
Special Edition 
The purpose of the special edition is to explore the implications of working in dynamic and often controversial health 
contexts for social work practice, education, and research and theory development. Social work is an established 
interdisciplinary and transnational health care profession, contributing eﬀ ective skills, interventions and technologies 
and providing measurable outcomes for health and wellbeing. Social work education seeks to oﬀ er state of the art 
teaching and learning opportunities in order to prepare students for working in interdisciplinary teams caring for 
individuals, families and communities. Social work students and practitioners are encouraged to undertake active 
leadership in health systems responding to the complex health and social needs of culturally diverse communities. 
Social work research evidences new interventions and sources of knowledge in collaboration with other health care 
disciplines and consumers of health services. Social work academics oﬀ er radical theories and insights as to achieving 
social justice and equality through health and social care policy, legislation and practices. Contributions representing 
advances in best and creative practice, education and research in social work in health care settings are therefore 
invited, together with interdisciplinary and international submissions. 
Submission Deadline 
The deadline for submissions for this special edition is March 10th, 2018. 
Two copies of the manuscript should be submitted to the editor’s oﬃ  ce, sent via e-mail to the administrator of the 
academic papers who will also provide additional information upon request:  barbora.grundelova@osu.cz. One copy 
should be free of any information which would lead to the identiﬁ cation of the author/s. The other copy should be a 
complete version of the article.
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neoliberal era.  As public educational institutions have been dismantled and privatized, 
professors have been pressured and bullied by administrators and state oﬃ  cials to 
abandon advocacy work. And with the decline of American labor unions, productive 
venues for progressive activism have also begun to dry up.
Conspiratorial and extremist personalities have stepped forward to ﬁ ll the left vacuum. 
“Left” thinkers embrace authoritarian false prophets such as Assad in Syria and 
Putin in Russia, and portray these faux revolutionaries as on the vanguard of “anti-
imperialism,” despite their repressive domestic human rights records, simply because 
they are against American militarism.  Others on the left fall into conspiracism, 
embracing 9/11 trutherism, and various “deep state” conspiracies such as claims that a 
secret intelligence apparatus was responsible for the JFK assassination and for framing 
Nixon for Watergate.  Never mind that there is a federal recording (made by Nixon 
himself) in which the former president openly speaks about paying oﬀ  the Watergate 
burglars with hush money; we wouldn’t want to let evidence get in the way of a good 
conspiracy.
With the rise of “Brown-Red” alliance propaganda, some “leftists” have thrown their 
lot in with truly despicable individuals.  For example, McKinney and Cobb have 
recently sought to make common cause with noted Alex Jones groupies such as Mike 
Cernovich and Robert Steele, both with deeply troubled histories of embracing white 
nationalism.  Cernovich shamelessly embraces the rhetoric of “alt-right” sexists, 
referring to men he deems insuﬃ  ciently masculine as “cucks,” while embracing 
conspiracy theories such as Pizzagate, and advocating IQ testing for immigrants.  
He has claimed that date rapeis not real, and has encouraged men to “slut shame” 
black women to avoid AIDS.  Steele is a David Duke sympathizer who publishes 
commentary along with Duke about the dangers of the “Zionist deep state,” as 
tied to conspiracies about how Jews control American politics, media, and banking 
institutions.  Steele gained infamy after an appearance on Alex Jones’ Info Wars 
claiming that NASA was running a child slavery ring on Mars.  And Steele explicitly 
compares Jews to animals, although I will not do him or Duke the favor of linking to 
any of his repulsive commentaries.  Echoing Steele’s anti-semitism, McKinney also has 
a long, sordid history of collaborating with blatant anti-semites, despite the presence 
of many anti-Zionist activists and intellectuals throughout the U.S. and the world who 
reject anti-semitism.
I’ve recently heard from numerous self-described leftists who defend the supporters of 
the “Brown-Red” alliance agenda, but the moral bankruptcy of these apologists’ claims 
have been stripped bare considering the wretched politics of individuals like Steele 
and Cernovich.  Steele has reached out to me in the past, seeking to recruit me in his 
battle against “the deep state.”  It was immediately clear that there was something 
very wrong with this man, which was apparent when he started spouting “deep state” 
conspiracies about Watergate, 9/11, and JFK.  Not yet knowing about his anti-semitism, 
I politely told him I had no interest in anything he was selling.  That Green Party leaders 
could be supportive of such a ﬁ gure speaks poorly of their judgment.
Marginalized from access to mainstream political, economic, or media institutions, 
some claiming to speak for “the left” have concluded that the path forward is in allying 
with fascist forces on the right.  This act of desperation reveals the utter failure of 
the Green Party to make serious inroads with the public or in gaining political power.  
But this Hail Mary is destined to fail. No progressive social movement is ever going to 
be built by propping up reactionary bigots and conspiracy theorists, who have zero 
interest in the ﬁ ght against economic inquality, racism, and capitalism more broadly.  
Progressively minded people would be far better served opposing the relatively small 
number of Americans who openly advocate reactionary white nationalism, and instead 
focusing on the millions of people of color, in addition to working class, middle class, 
and poor Americans who are all increasingly left behind in an era of growing corporate, 
plutocratic power over politics.  There is still time to return respectability to the 
progressive community in America, but this can’t happen so long as fascist enablers 
speak for the left. 
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Call for Abstracts 
Building Networks and Frameworks for Global Social Work 
Annual Symposium 
September 16-18, 2018
Valuing Diversity in Global Social Work: Practice with People on the Move
• Human rights and advocacy
• Emancipatory practices, strength based, reﬂ ection, 
critical
• Social work in response to populism
• Border crossings and people on the move 
• Migration, integration and diversity studies
• Cultural studies and social work 
• Transnational social work 
• Internationalizing the curriculum 
• Examples of international research collaboration
Guide for submitting abstracts and publishing an abstract: 
The deadline to submit abstracts is 30 June, 2018. Abstracts should be 1000 words in length (Arial front size 10, 
1.5 spacing). To submit your abstract, please attach your abstract as a PDF document (email title: SYMPOSIUM-
YOUR SURNAME-ABSTRACT- TITLE) to rcsssymposium@gmail.com . This symposium is designed to be a catalyst 
for publishing research, theories, models and examples of best practice for the promotion of global social work. 
Abstracts should provide an opportunity to explore new lines of critical thinking, practice, and related global 
social work.  Various disciplinary lenses will be considered, however social work provide the framework for the 
symposium. See the Sage publishing recommendations for authors: http://studysites.uk.sagepub.com/repository/
binaries/pdf/SAGE_UK_style_guide_short.pdf.
 
Important Dates
• Deadline for abstract submission    8th May, 2018 
• Symposium Registration opens    21st April, 2018  
• Notiﬁ cation of acceptance     23rd June, 2018
• Symposium      16-18 September, 2018
 
For all general enquiries, please contact: anish@rajagiri.edu
The themes for this symposium include 
Rajagiri College of Social Sciences, Kochi, Kerala, India
Rajagiri College of Social Sciences, University of Eastern Finland, University of Utah, and Hochschule Landshut 
invite abstracts for the 3rd international symposium on Valuing Diversity in Global Social Work: Practice with 
People on the Move. The symposium is one of a series of themed scholarly gatherings building on an emerging 
network of European, United Kingdom, Australian, Asian, African and USA academics. The challenge of diversity 
and people on the move is one of a number of emerging global issues, including population movement across 
borders, civil conﬂ ict and violence, populism, ageing demographics, environmental sustainability, which are placing 
new demands on the relevance of social work. The symposium is speciﬁ cally targeted at social work practitioners, 
students and academics committed sustainable change. The symposium oﬀ ers a balanced academic and social 
program so as to encourage opportunities for building networks. The venue for the symposium is Rajagiri College 
of Social Sciences (RCSS), located in the beautiful city of Kochi, Kerala India.
The participants in the inaugural conference in Salisbury 
formed a steering committee to provide long term 
continuity. As the conference grew with meetings in 
Helsinki in 2012 (Austin et al., 2014) and New York in 
2014 (Epstein et al. 2015; Fisher, 2014), the initial vision 
developed to reﬂ ect the issues important in the host 
country and region. 
The Hong Kong conference provided strong reasons 
to take this further. The conference organiser was very 
clear from the outset that bringing the conference to 
Hong Kong should provide an opportunity to reﬂ ect the 
development of social work in China and South-East 
Asia more broadly (Sim, 2016). 
In particular, his success in recruiting sponsors from 
several countries raised the proﬁ le of practice and 
increased the number of practitioners attending. This 
gave rise to some reﬂ ection on whether the largely 
academic language of research was appropriate as a 
framework for the exchange of ideas, with practitioners 
arguing that a more everyday, more direct practice 
ICPR2017 – The Fourth 
International Conference on 
Practice Research: overview
Ci-Siou CHIN
Diane Ciro
Mike Fisher
Clara Ji
Razwana Begum
Abdul Rahim
Ying Lien 
Florence Ka-yu Wu
The fourth international conference on practice 
research took place in Hong Kong in May 2017. From 
small beginnings in Salisbury (UK) in 2008 attended by 
25 people, the Hong Kong ICPR 2017 was attended by 
over 265 people from 33 countries.
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language would better suit a practice research 
conference. Changing the language might be one way of 
signalling the improving partnership between practice 
and research.
These discussions crystallised a growing discussion 
in the steering committee about how to ensure 
greater continuity between conferences, and greater 
participation in setting the agenda for the 2020 
conference in Melbourne, Australia. The steering 
committee was discussing mechanisms (special interest 
groups, online exchanges) to improve dialogue, at the 
same time as new participants became interested in 
coordinating and leadership roles.
This spirit of improved dialogue was also evident a new 
framework for the ﬁ nal summary session. Instead of 
a member of the steering committee identifying key 
themes, we convened a group of participants and asked 
them to take the ﬂ oor during the ﬁ nal plenary and give 
their thoughts on what should be addressed. This is of 
course imperfect, as we had no mechanisms to ‘elect’ 
people to this role and could only rely on steering 
group members to identify people who might be willing 
to join a workshop just before the plenary to deﬁ ne 
issues from their perspective. Whatever its democratic 
shortcomings, it is nevertheless a ﬁ rst step to hearing a 
greater range of voices.
The authors of this article formed a group to address 
the ﬁ nal plenary. We were fortunate to have the 
participation of Florence Ka-yu Wu who oﬀ ered skilled 
translation to ensure that people could use in their 
ﬁ rst language. The following section is an account by 
members of this group of the issues they brought to the 
closing plenary.
In the summary session of the fourth ICPR, Mike 
Fisher coordinated a group of participants, including 
the practitioners and researchers, to discuss the 
recommendations for the next conference. In the third 
International Conference of Practice Research (ICPR), 
the theme “Building bridges not pipelines: Promoting 
two-way traﬃ  c between practice and research” has 
already stipulated the importance of engaging the 
true collaboration between the academic researchers 
and frontline practitioner (Sim, 2016). This has laid the 
foundation for the Fourth ICPR to focus on “recognizing 
diversity, developing collaborations, building networks” 
of social work practitioners, practitioner-researcher, 
researchers, and service users. This discussion group 
conﬁ rmed the rationale of the fourth ICPR to build 
network and echoes with the theme of the Conference 
emphasizing diversity and collaborations. 
The plenary session oﬀ ered an excellent opportunity for 
exchanging ideas among stakeholders of the practice 
research as well. The group recognized the diligent 
work of the conference organizers to (1) have invited 
renowned scholars in the ﬁ eld of Practice Research to 
gain knowledge from the speakers and these insightful 
exchanges have stimulated the practitioners to pursue 
practice research further; (2) have included international 
participants to have like-minded people joining for 
sharing knowledge and skills; (3) have initiated diﬀ erent 
modes of engagement, such as workshops, plenaries 
and poster presentations, to enrich the conference 
participants’ understanding of practice research. 
Apart from the positive aspects of the Conference, the 
discussion group also highlighted several challenges in 
conducting practice research as listed below.     
(1) “Practicizing” the language
The change to a more direct practice language has 
undoubtedly improved the partnership between 
the researchers and practitioners. The meaning 
of “practice language” goes beyond the bridging 
between the academics and practitioners. With a 
broader international audience being engaged in the 
Conference, culturally and linguistically diverse needs 
should be attended to. Limited proﬁ ciency in English 
might have discouraged participants from sharing their 
ideas. Using their ﬁ rst language enables the participants 
to voice their views and opinions in discussions. All 
voices are ensured to be heard in diﬀ erent sessions if 
simultaneous interpretation and translation service is 
provided. 
(2) Increasing practitioners’ capacity 
to conduct practice research
Members of the group, mostly composed of 
practitioners, have exerted much eﬀ ort in implementing 
daily programmatic arrangements and administration 
at their workplace. Less energy has been put forth in 
conducting practice research even if the practitioners 
are able and willing. More guidance on how to conduct 
empirical practice research is expected. Members 
were concerned about the access, accuracy, reliability 
and funding resources for data collection as well as 
the possibility of publishing their results. Support 
from academics and publishers will help forge the 
practitioners’ engagement in research.   
(3) Understanding the uniqueness of 
each driver of the research studies
Diﬀ erent stakeholders (people who use services; policy 
makers; government; funders; practitioners; academics) 
have diﬀ erent purposes in conducting practice research. 
The diﬀ erent and sometimes conﬂ icting objectives 
of diﬀ erent stakeholders made it harder for researchers or 
practitioners to conduct research targeted at speciﬁ c issue and 
providing concrete solutions. Members of the group are not asking 
for the consensus of research topics amongst the stakeholders. 
Instead, understanding the uniqueness of each stakeholder helps 
solicit outcomes that best cater for the needs of each party. 
(4) Enhancing practitioners’ coordinating and 
leadership roles 
The open dialogue between the academic researchers and 
practitioners has fostered the true practice-research collaboration. 
Practitioners are encouraged to coordinate or lead some interest 
groups to focus on practice-oriented questions and research 
question formulation. The increasing involvement of practitioners 
in leading roles empowers practitioners’ eﬃ  cacy in continuing 
practice research in their workplace. 
The Hong Kong Practice Research Conference started the process 
of improving the relationship between practice and research in the 
conference organization. We hope that Lynette Joubert and her 
colleagues planning the Melbourne Conference in 2020 will be able 
to build on these ideas. 
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Teaching cross cultural practices to social work 
students: A reﬂ ective journey 
Dr. Venkat Pulla 
Australian 
Catholic 
University
This paper is drawn from my teaching 
experience and contributions to curriculum 
development within in Australian Universities. 
More recently a teaching team of three 
Lecturers began writing a new unit of social 
work study called SWTP217: Social work 
with culturally and linguistically diverse 
communities, (CALD) for the accredited 
BSW programme at the Australian Catholic 
University. The core questions that we 
pondered were: How do we engage students 
in reﬂ exive practice with diverse communities?  
This paper is based on my understanding of 
the collective learning that shaped teaching 
and planning of assessments and my teaching 
practice in this unit.  Speciﬁ c to SWTP 217 
Unit, the intended learning outcomes, (ILOs), 
that students ought to demonstrate an 
understanding of the impact of the Australian 
migration history, related social policy with 
an emphasis on how those policies  impact 
on the experiences of a range of migrant, 
refugee and asylum seeker populations and  
how these communities fare.  The second 
crucial objective is to have class room based 
opportunities to develop competencies in 
cross cultural practice and service delivery.   
A reﬂ ective Journey
At the outset, I found Susan Alder’s approach (2011) of conducting a narrative inquiry into diversity, to be useful. 
The following diagram is my adaptation for this article.  
Introduction
Susan Alder’s approach of narrative inquiry (2011)
In which students 
examine their 
personal and social 
lives; including their 
beliefs, experiences 
and racial biases as 
cultural beings,
reﬂ ecting on what 
have been their 
interactions with 
families of colour 
and considering 
how these 
interactions,
impact on ‘their 
diverse knowledge’
Alder, expects that the students undertake a personal 
review of their beliefs and biases; reﬂ ect over and duly 
consider how they may have already impacted on their 
knowledge of diversity ((2011, p 620). However I raise 
a deeper question such as, how has this knowledge 
of the world distorted/inﬂ uenced our perceptions of 
another individual’s reality or the truth. It is their truth 
as they perceive it. As a teacher my own epistemology 
strongly deploys such reﬂ ectivity. My narratives assist 
the students to grow intellectually and organically.  This 
process is similar to Gramscian counter hegemony 
which suggests development of a transformation 
power from within (Pulla, 2017).  In Gramscian terms, 
a thinking individual contributes to action. I see the 
role and purpose of social work teaching in preparing 
such ‘organic intellectuals’ that could work towards a 
fundamental transformation of society (Gramsci, 1987: 
161-323, Pulla, 2016a, Pulla, 2016b, and Pulla, 2017).  
Utilising auto ethnographic accounts and research 
ﬁ ndings based on grounded theory approaches 
(Charmaz, 2014, Pulla, 2016a) further assist me in 
helping students to delineate and deconstruct their own 
professional and personal experiences. Additionally it 
allows me to generalise and resonate with the lives of 
my audience and the lives of others that they know (Ellis 
2004:194-195, Townson, and Pulla, 2015).  Through such 
constructivist agenda devoid of pre-conceived notions, 
opportunities are created for the learners to construct 
their own cognitive maps unique to their experience and 
their needs (Neuman and Blundo, 2000).   
I consider self-awareness, critical reﬂ exivity, and 
analytical thinking as being integral to social work 
teaching and practice (Urdang, 2010).   Similarly I 
believed that reﬂ exivity, positionality, privilege, situated 
knowledge and perceptions are intrinsically woven into 
the profession aﬀ ording a self-reﬂ ective process.  In my 
approach, I  trans context day to day living of migrants 
and refugees; utilising their culturally diverse narratives  
and their  ‘lived in’  experience of  seeing discrimination 
and inequities occur to them. The questions raised also 
will allow the students to understand how these new 
migrants perceive the social construct of privilege. On a 
personal reﬂ ection teaching SWTP 217, has been a great 
privilege in ACU. As an immigrant academic, the task of 
teaching this unit provided me an opportunity to reﬂ ect 
upon and relevantly share my narrative of living in 
Australia. I begin with a statement that some of us bear 
multiple social identities; live in two cultures—I talk to 
my own migration, cultural and adaptation experience 
(Berry, 1997) as I take great pride of being an Australian 
just as I am equally proud of my land of birth, India.  
One’s own experiential learning is deﬁ ned by Houle as 
‘education that occurs as a direct participation in the 
events of life’ (Houle, 1980, p 221). Thus teaching this 
allowed me to pass on such experiential learning (Kolbe 
(1984) of my direct participation in Australian society. 
Articulate the 
impact of key 
historical and 
social policy 
issues on the 
experiences 
of migrant, 
refugee and 
asylum seeker 
populations
(Lecture Contents in brief) Australian migration policy; Social 
policies concerning migrants, refugees and asylum seekers; 
racism, prejudice and white priviledge
(Tutorial contents) Deﬁ ning diversity, culture, introducing 
cultural responsiveness, exploring one’s own identity
(Reﬂ ection) Utilisation of reﬂ ective writing
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Proﬁ le of My students
My second year BSW students are still in their formative 
years with limited exposure to social work issues. Their 
exposure to social issues is varied and have limited 
understanding of what happens in social work.  Many 
of them come from schools where career guidance or 
aptitude matching has occurred prior to their entry 
into the tertiary portals. By the same token they have 
not had any prior opportunity to see much social work 
in action. Within this cohort we also have a very small 
number of mature age students that bring with them 
their narratives of real life, pre-existing skills from 
employment and additional caring responsibilities 
such as caring for a person with disability or caring for 
a member of their household with mental illness or 
caring for siblings that are frail aged that are closer to 
social work profession (Fraser and Baker, 2014). Some 
of my students are academically committed and many 
others are keen to ﬁ nish the degree in order to obtain a 
‘decent job’ (Biggs and Tang’s (2011). My own reﬂ ection 
is that there are a substantial number of students in 
the middle order, that respond to a higher level of 
scaﬀ olding   of matters pertaining to cross cultural 
diversity, acquiring competencies etc, through focus 
grouped discussions and through case studies that are 
set in the style of  ‘problem based learning’ (Biggs and 
Tang, 2011, pp 5-7).  
Within social work it is well considered view that 
‘that the knowledge, understanding acceptance and 
sensitivity to cultural and human diversity is prerequisite 
for eﬀ ective work with our clients’ (Chau, 1990, p-124).  
To that end my teaching strategies incrementally 
build on the Intended learning Outcomes (ILOs) as 
outlined below.  The following four diagrams that are 
self-explanatory show how the The Intended Learning 
Outcomes (ILOs)  are matched with Lecture and Tutorial 
Contents
Assessment Tasks
I will now brieﬂ y address the assessment tasks that were 
set for this unit with sequenced learning. Sequencing’ 
learning is very important (Nulty, 2011) and likewise 
it is also important to make students to get a grasp 
of the concept. The idea is to letting them apply their 
understanding in tutorial settings and become culturally 
responsive and conﬁ dent to utilise them in real life 
situations when they are in practice settings.   
The ﬁ rst task that I set is a reﬂ ective piece. It begins 
with the student’s personal reﬂ ection.  Written as a 
personal narrative the students introduce themselves 
and focus on their cultural identity and reﬂ ect on how 
their cultural identity informs their professional identity 
and their practice as a social worker.  The second part 
of the assignment of 800 words expects the student 
to choose an ethnic group from a pre-selected list 
that is provided to the student. The student has an 
opportunity to display their analytical and research skills 
in generating a culturally diﬀ erent from their own.  The 
second assignment relates to the concepts of racism 
and the possibility of social work intervention. This 
reﬂ ective assignment challenges them and expects the 
students to reﬂ ect on practical strategies that will attack 
prejudices in our society. Three questions are important 
in this context.  How do we retain the motivation of 
our students? How do we oﬀ er them a new set of 
information and ideas? And ﬁ nally how do we create an 
opportunity for them to think?  Once we are clear on 
how to set our answers to the above questions, we are 
already on the right track.  On a reﬂ ection I understand 
that values accrue to a task for a variety of reasons: 
extrinsic, where the consequences bring something that 
we desire and want (Biggs and Tang, 2011, p55). 
Apply key 
cultural 
theories 
within a 
framework of 
social justice 
and human 
rights cultural 
social work 
practice
(Lecture Contents in brief) Globalisation, Human rights 
and social and economic justice, Theories of oppression & 
discrimination and Theories of acculturation and adaption
(Tutorial contents) What migration and social policies 
have impacted on this community?
(Reﬂ ection) For eﬀ ective cross cultural practice ‘support 
opinion with data’
As a teacher I have made use of this value to bring about 
positive results and these results are:
 • Improved reading habits
 • Better quality discussions in tutorials 
 • Nearly 100 percent attendance in tutorials  
To recap the aim of this unit is to build cultural responsiveness 
to bring awareness to my students about the amazing 
connections between this unit and the core values central to 
social work that are of dignity of humanity and global solidarity. 
We are living in a postmodern world full of subjectivism and 
crass materialism.  All students may not have a well-grounded 
understanding or exposure to the good work of Caritas or  EZE 
or BFW or ICCO and other non-governmental agencies that  
carry on their silent activities throughout the world in strife 
stricken areas such as  in Syria or elsewhere. Similarly many 
students may not know that refugees coming by boats actually 
succumbed to the deep seas and lost their lives before some 
survivors hitting the Australian shore.  Nor many of them 
know that the Australian federal government has renamed its 
‘department of multicultural aﬀ airs’ as the department of ‘the 
border’ or border security.  Thus when we discuss such issues 
we don’t merely pass information, we brieﬂ y critique emerging 
policies but take their impacts seriously.  I consider such 
teaching to be central to critical theory (Leonardo, 2004) and 
aligned constructivism (Biggs, 1996). Such an approach not only 
enhances teaching through constructive alignment but provides 
us a teaching responsibly to constantly remind the students 
about the common good, including help for the poor and 
oppressed, and our shared and intertwined common futures. 
Findings:
One major ﬁ nding for me as a mentor / teacher is to provide 
enough opportunity for reﬂ ection for the student.  In my 
teaching I realised that strengths perspective advantages   
social work teaching as it sits closer to the resilience paradigm 
that is present in education (Pulla et Al, 2012).  Additionally 
the strengths perspective acknowledges the students with 
a sense of recognition of their own personal strengths and 
assets, thus providing the motivation to meet their goals. I 
utilise this as  part of a my own pedagogical  framework to 
address both fragility and creativity in the classroom learning 
environment and to understand the complexities of culturally 
and Linguistically Diverse challenges in our society today 
including those presented in  the classroom.  Such an approach 
has proved handy for me in teaching from the narratives of 
the migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Similarly teaching 
about racism, prejudice and white privilege; understanding 
culture and cultural diﬀ erences and cultural relativism. The 
analogy extends to mental health and wellbeing deﬁ ned from 
the client perspectives, sometimes pretty challenging for 
the students.  In teaching this unit of cross cultural methods 
beginning with conversations around the above signiﬁ cant 
issues right in the second year of social work of a four year 
social work programme has been rather useful. Needless to 
mention that discussion around ethical issues and dilemmas 
in cross cultural practice goes hand in hand which is once 
again a great opportunity for teachers to assist the students to  
increase contents for Self-awareness and reﬂ ection. 
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i am building a wall 
when they ask me what i’m doing
at the end of this long campaign
when they ask which causes I’m pursuing
these words are my refrain  
i will say: 
i am building a wall
i am building a wall with the press of my palms
i am building a wall i am asking for alms
from mexico; brexit, yo
nigel farage you are farang i will build you a garage 
and it will only have three walls
it will drive you up one of them – 
i am building the fourth wall, just you wait for it
i will make bertolt brecht pay for it
nobody can break it they’ll all come to grief
this past month has been the longest suspension of 
disbelief –
i am building a wall out of loonies and hicks
i will bury dead immigrants under the bricks
i will separate lovers and split families
there are the best practices from chinese
they will see from the moon the results of my reign
i will make America a great wall again –
i am building a wallﬂ ower a witling seasonal succulent
climbing weed one indiscretion one microaggression at 
a time
i am willing her into her place i am building her live
she’s ﬁ ve - no, a six - really, six? no, a ﬁ ve.
i am building a wallﬂ ower may ﬂ ower
may i? no need for consent
we can judge by intent
i am building a wal-do a wally where is he
where are the red and white stripes of his hat
where is his equally red and white striped girlfriend
where is he beneath the white stars in the blue night
i cannot ﬁ nd him among the immigrants
who are playing sudoku and have put wally out of a job
i am building a wal-mart
with the tall parts and the small farts
i am building a wal-mart in north korea
and the chinese are going to pay for it
i am building a wall street journal
my name is elite and eternal in the halls
of the washington mall
i am building a walrus
And i am a carpenter
suddenly all of us
pursued by dementors
they’re foreigners, toll ‘em!
expect patronum!
in the wispy dull night
my patronus is white.
Joshua Ip is the founder of Sing Lit Station (SLS), a literary charity that 
brings readers and writers closer together. SLS organises the 5,000 strong 
Singapore Poetry Writing Month (SingPoWriMo) writing group on facebook, 
runs multiple workshop groups for young writers and the migrant worker 
community in Singapore, and puts together an annual Manuscript 
Bootcamp for poetry and prose. SLS does its best to inject the beauty 
of literature into urban life, through programmes like Singapore Poetry 
On The Sidewalks - invisible poetry stenciled in waterproof ink that only 
appears in the rain; and poetry ﬂ ash mobs on subways and buses. You can 
ﬁ nd out more at singlitstation.com
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i am building a wall
i am building a wall
i am willing a bald spot out of existence
there is no resistance
i am billing you for that call
i am welding you to the toilet stall
i am building my way back to a world
before orange is the new black
i am whitewashing your yellowface
i am waltzing with her majesty her grace
i am building a walt disney world
version of wall-e, the secret walter
mitty my male fantasy, i am bill clintoning
a lewinsky, I am beaming my stupidity
into your feed whether you need it or not
i’m building a walk to the park
i’m building an ark for the two by two families
i’m building a trigger Obama you notable ﬁ gure
i’m building a trigger warning, an awning we can shelter 
under
i am building the warp and the woof
i am building the truth
which is bigger than the voice of america’s youth 
something there is that doesn’t love a wall  
well fuck you robert frost I’m building it
you lost i’m killing it
so you can be that little dutch boy who sticks his ﬁ nger 
in the hole in the wall
which is a dam or a dyke
we don’t give either of those
america chose!  
or you can build a wall full of words
full of herds
a wall full of sheep a wall full of sheep
i will count them and recount them
for i have promises to keep
and a conservative veep
i’m gonna make a great leap
forward before twitter beeps
i lurve the steep learning curve
and miles to sow before I reap 
two roads diverged in a yellow wood
i’m going to cut down the wood
i’m gonna spray paint it white
and i’m gonna use it to build a wall
over both roads
and that’s gonna make all the diﬀ erence
(permission from author 
to reproduce his poem, 
also in Griﬃ  th review 57, 
pp.23-26)
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